2009年，一場完美的金融風暴！

貨幣戰爭：奧巴馬夸下的刺激經濟的?？谥辽傩枰?.5萬億美元，拯救商業銀行至少需要2-3萬億美元，總額將高達5萬億美元左右。我們認為這是一個不可能完成的任務。美國國債市場2009年存在著崩盤的危險！隨之而來的要么是長期利率飆升，要么是惡性通貨膨脹。美國要守住美元體系，就必然承受利率猛漲，從而導致利率火山爆發，進入危機的第三階段。或者保住利率穩定，則必須承受惡性通脹的后果，結果可能導致美元地位危機，從而直接進入危機的第四階段,美元冰河期。天下沒有免費的午餐，當然如果美國使用戰爭手段，情況可能會有所不同。

（譯者：大頭姍）

盡管一直在持續的銀行危機，全球政府終于將控制權掌握在手中是共同的主題。雖然程度深而且持續時間長的經濟衰退不可避免，但是蕭條看上去可以轉化。Roubinis如此說。19世紀30年代的相同決策失誤已經被重復了。美聯儲擴張主義的政策已經成功的顯著改變了收益率曲線。政府現在正在掌權，不是么？

昨日FT專欄Martin Wolf讓我們停下來思考。它舉了美國刺激計劃方案的問題。
上周，總統當選人奧巴馬正式宣布他的美國恢復計劃和再投資計劃。其標題經過了慎重選擇，令人吃驚的是，對于奧巴馬來叔，似乎其他國家政策對美國的命運沒有任何的影響。他也說，似乎一個大的財政刺激就足以恢復經濟的繁榮。如果這就是他所認為，那奧巴馬就會遇到打擊。他面臨的困難要比這些程度更深而且更全球性。
伊夫奧爾特史密斯總結Wolf的觀點說
如果我有這個權利， “被需要”的刺激計劃是10 ％ （充分就業赤字+ 7 ％ ，或在未來兩年內，每年17%。奧巴馬提供的未來兩年5 ％，或2.5 ％每年，加上基準的8.3 ％ ，共計10.7 ％ 。 ）

因此，去獲得我們需要（如果您同意這類計算邏輯）是一個額外的6.3 ％ ，即占國內生產總值的a ％ 。請記住，奧巴馬的計劃是大約2.5 ％的速度,6.3/2.5 = 2.5倍。
如果你相信數學，奧巴馬的計劃會需要2.5倍的多資本才能完成他的預算。這是在你進入具體細節之前結果，如“減稅可能比其他措施的效果小” 。

一個更大的刺激計劃—即使注定是戲劇性的—在這點上依然可能。是可以獲得的。

OECD的主要指標正指出中國GDP增長出現一個完全而迅速的崩潰。愛德華制作了2個表，用了另一個不包含OECD計算方法的指標---發電量。

發電量與GDP的關系：

如果中國經濟崩潰，或者放緩速度顯著，那其巨大外匯儲備存在的理由---好比一個抑制國內通貨膨脹的防御措施---將會蒸發消失，同樣中國的美國財政部控股也會消失，或者中國人民幣可能貶值。

無論哪種情況出現，美國將陷入困境之中。國債價格可能崩潰（不過鑒于目前新的銀行倒閉的擔憂，它會在一個明顯反彈之后發生），如果這種情況發生，美聯儲量化寬松政策將給政府留下巨大爛攤子。任何刺激經濟的方案也會如此。

可以想象這將帶來唯一核心的選擇：美元貶值。

中國為什么會讓其發生？

當然，當局者20世紀30年代已經受到了教訓，我們可以依靠他們做正確的事情？這要看代價是什么了。如果代價是推翻中國共產黨，那人民幣貶值毫無疑毫無疑問。就如經濟學家近期指出的，經濟學家和銀行家懇求HOOVER總統不簽署1930年的斯幕特協議---霍利關稅法（譯者：《斯姆特－霍利關稅法》：即《Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act》，該法案旨在建立高關稅壁壘以保護美國市場，被后來的學者認為是引發上世紀30年代全球經濟大蕭條的導火索）

紐約時報：拯救銀行意味著國有化

Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization

http://currencywar.blog.hexun.com/28454948_d.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/business/16banking.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&ref=business

貨幣戰爭：鮑爾森方案是金錢換股份，伯南克方案是CDS置換。鮑爾森方案簡單明了，但隨著花旗和美國銀行股價暴跌，實際上已不可行，即全部國有化銀行所注入的資金已不足挽救這兩大巨頭自有資本金的損失。伯南克方案抓住了CDS擔保失效是導致銀行資金短缺的要害，但代價是財政部將成為兩巨頭最大的CDS擔保者以置換對沖基金和保險公司，其核心是拯救對沖基金而犧牲納稅人的利益。兩巨頭或者更多的5巨頭的總損失規模將在2-3萬億美元之間，納稅人將成為主要買單者。超大規模的國債發行已不可避免，而美國國債持有人也將與美國納稅人一起承受嚴重的購買力縮水的損失。2009年下半年，美國國債市場將面臨一場嚴峻考驗。

我國很多學者天真地認為奧巴馬政府一旦全力拯救銀行，一切問題都將迎刃而解，他們以為美國政府能夠隨意印錢，市場則會照單全收。2008年美國財政赤字高達4800億美元，而今年在不考慮商業銀行救助的情況下已達到驚世駭俗的1.2萬億美元，如果把銀行損失所導致的政府救助加入，2009年美國國債發行量將達到3萬億美元，這還不算每年的國債利息支出的5000億。這個數字是正常年份的5倍以上，美國總儲蓄率接近0，國內金融機構現金嚴重短缺，這就是銀行需要救助的主要原因，因此要消化如此驚人的國債只能依賴外國投資人，但目前的情況是各國都在減持美國國債，只有中國例外。即使中國出于種種原因想幫美國，但其胃口絕對消化不了這么大的量。最后只有美聯儲自己大量吃進，而這就是超大規?；A貨幣增發，惡性通脹將難以避免。

（譯者：大頭姍） 

華盛頓—去年夏天，在聯邦和財政部做出了一個又一個政府救助金融機構的舉措后，他們承受巨大的痛苦來避免做任何影響銀行的國有化。

周二，在巴爾迪麼的法院外有抗議銀行無抵押權的拍賣行為。拍賣活動發生在抗議之后。當銀行開始掙扎時，消費者和房主也是如此。

他們或許無法在擁有奢侈品。當國家2個最大的銀行屈服于即將到來的新一輪巨大損失時，奧巴馬的團隊和美聯儲正在處理那些被稱為“大到不能倒閉”的銀行的問題，而且他們如今因經濟下滑致使他們資本的破壞而無法正常發揮功能。

尤其是花旗銀行，它的損失非常大，以至于從數學角度來說，只有通過政府注入足夠多的資金而獲得大部分股份或者至少取代現有的股東才能夠解救它。

奧巴馬對于7000億救世計劃的剩下那部分的使用方案中，要求政府在銀行重大事件中占據更加重要的地位，包括從他們支付給股東的分紅到支付給高級主管的獎金。

蘇格蘭皇家銀行分析師說：“美國還沒看到，從杰克遜關閉美國第二大國家銀行開始，國家就已經踏上了（銀行國家化）的道路，我們將回到政府控制銀行體系的時代。

周四，將近于1200億用來救助美國銀行的資金------包括注入資本和吸收損失-----同時，11月份的3000億的花旗銀行救助資金，都代表著用來為銀行提供資本的金融行動并表現出現對銀行資本的控制。

財政部和美聯儲官員通過構建與保險計劃相當大的的救助銀行最大毒性資產行動來完成這個計謀。

政府并沒有像財政部門那樣通過資本注入，投資千億納稅人的資金來購買銀行的優先股去救助它們，而是在根本上將銀行從威脅資產中解放出來。

分析師說新救助方法的問題是，它很可能遮蓋住納稅人所承擔的風險。如果政府擔保的證券變得一文不值，保險金的成本可能比財政部第一時間以現金救助銀行所需要的花費多得多。

另一分析師說，此種方法掩蓋住了政府已經為花旗銀行大股東的事實?！皼]有其他任何人會投資他們，我們已經擁有它們了”

博南克在周一概述了奧巴馬新管理團隊對于救助銀行方案的幾點要素。

博南克警告說，如果有任何恢復當前癱瘓的信貸市場的希望，聯邦政府除了將更多的錢注入到銀行中或金融機構，別無它選。

眾所周知，TARP救援計劃已經激怒了兩黨的國會議員，這些人抱怨說美國財政部長鮑爾森已經向小型銀行注入資金而不要求義務性的回報。奧巴馬和它的高級經濟顧問確信的說：對于阻止更大的金融崩潰，支撐銀行非常重要，而且提供書面保證會解決議員們的最大抱怨。

但是博南克提出了一系列的在今后幾個月中處理銀行問題的選擇，所有這些選擇都體現出從布什政府最初設想的重要轉變。

鮑爾森堅持認為政府只能投資在健康的銀行中，也許這些銀行有些會接管其競爭對手。財政部將投資納稅人的錢來換取優先股，這將支付定期股息并獲得認證股權，而政府可以通過股價的上漲賺取利潤。

相比之下，博南克提出了各種“剝離問題資產“的方法，這些問題資產包從不良貸款到住房抵押貸款證券，是人們不會在任何價格購買的。

博南克的做法包括保護銀行資產，是在美國銀行和花旗銀行救助計劃中核心的問題。11月份花旗銀行獲得了救助計劃，但是上周五的報告預計，它的損失可能突破100億美元。

在這兩項交易中，聯邦政府設立了一個能限制銀行損失其數十億美元最差資產的復雜安排。

花期集團在11月份的交易中獲得了3000億美元的資產?；ㄆ诩瘓F同意承擔首個290億美元的損失。美國財政部同意承擔新一輪的高達50億美元的損失，而聯邦儲蓄保險公司同意承擔第三輪高達100億美元的損失。美聯儲則同意以低利率借給花旗銀行錢。

作為第二個選擇。博南克和其他聯邦官員提出將銀行的受損資產放入一個新的獨立的“壞銀行“之中。其影響可能與政府提供保證相同：政府可能將自己從撥出更多的損失準備金的需要中解脫出來。

政府“包裹”和政府支持的“壞銀行”具有保護銀行普通股股東被政府取代的優點。

相比之下，不是政府最先的銀行重新資本化方法----注資來換取優先股股東和可轉換為普通股的認股權證------有排擠普通股的效應。這是因為，在銀行能夠在停止支付優先股股息之前，任何損失都將首先消除普通股股東。

“TARP的一個問題是政府不希望擁有銀行，如果你受損失，普通股就變少。我們所作的是希望保護一些資產，這是防止普通股股東的消失并提高普通股股價的方法。

但是越來越多的分析師警告說，此做法可能過于聰明，因其為決策者提供了太多掩飾銀行真正問題和風險方法。

“我們所擁有的是一個奇怪的，影子下的國有化進程。政府并不能也不應該想擁有銀行所有權。但是如果他們不得不陷入這個局面，他們必須解決這個情況。于此，你所擁有的是一個被公認的具有巨大的多元化的金融服務行業損失，并面臨在經營過程中的每個方面都存在損的情況。解決這個問題沒有任何簡單的方法?！?/p>

The perfect storm

Posted by Sam Jones on Jan 15 16:28.

This entry was posted by Sam Jones on Thursday, January 15th, 2009 at 16:28 and is filed under Capital markets. Tagged with china, Fed, Treasuries, Yuan.

紐約時報：拯救銀行意味著國有化

Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization

WASHINGTON — Last fall, as Federal Reserve and Treasury Department officials rode to the rescue of one financial institution after another, they took great pains to avoid doing anything that smacked of nationalizing banks.

They may no longer have that luxury. With two of the nation’s largest banks buckling under yet another round of huge losses, the incoming administration of Barack Obama and the Federal Reserve are suddenly dealing with banks that are “too big to fail” and yet unable to function as the sinking economy erodes their capital.

Particularly in the case of Citigroup, the losses have become so large that they make it almost mathematically impossible for the government to inject enough capital without taking a majority stake or at least squeezing out existing shareholders.

And the new ground rules laid down by Mr. Obama’s top economic advisers for the second half of the $700 billion bailout fund, as explained in a letter submitted to Congress on Thursday, call for the government to play an increasing role in the major activities of the banks, from the dividends they pay to shareholders to the amount they can pay executives.

“We are down a path that this country has not seen since Andrew Jackson shut down the Second National Bank of the United States,” said Gerard Cassidy, a banking analyst at RBC Capital Markets. “We are going to go back to a time when the government controlled the banking system.”

The approximately $120 billion aid package on Thursday for Bank of America — including injections of capital and absorbed losses — as well as a $300 billion package in November for Citigroup both represented displays of financial gymnastics aimed at providing capital without appearing to take commanding equity stakes.

Treasury and Fed officials accomplished that trick by structuring the deals like insurance programs for big bundles of the banks’ most toxic assets.

Instead of investing tens of billions of taxpayer dollars in exchange for preferred shares in the banks, which has been the Treasury Department’s approach so far with its capital infusions, the government essentially liberated the banks from some of their most threatening assets.

The trouble with the new approach, analysts say, is that it is likely to conceal the amount of risk that taxpayers are taking on. If the government-guaranteed securities turn out to be worthless, the cost of the insurance would be much higher than if the Treasury Department had simply bailed out the banks with cash in the first place.

Christopher Whalen, a managing partner at Institutional Risk Analytics, said the approach also covers up the underlying reality that the government is already essentially the majority shareholder in Citigroup.

“There’s nobody else out there to invest in them,” Mr. Whalen said. “We already own them.”

Ben S. Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, outlined the elements of what could become the Obama administration’s new approach to bank rescues in a speech on Monday.

Speaking to the London School of Economics, but addressing American audiences as much as European ones, Mr. Bernanke warned that the federal government had no choice but to put more money into banks and other financial institutions if it had any hope of reviving the paralyzed credit markets.

Known officially as the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, the rescue program has infuriated lawmakers in both parties, who complain that Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. has doled out money to banks without demanding accountability in return. Mr. Obama and his top economic advisers convinced enough lawmakers that shoring up the banks was essential to preventing a broader financial collapse, and offered written assurances that they would address the lawmakers’ biggest complaints.

But Mr. Bernanke proposed an array of alternative approaches to dealing with the banks in the months ahead, and all of those options reflected a fundamental shift from the original assumptions of the Bush administration.

Mr. Paulson had insisted that the government would be investing only in healthy banks, some of which might take over sicker rivals. The Treasury would invest taxpayer dollars in exchange for preferred shares, which would pay a regular dividend and come with warrants that would allow the government to profit from increases in company stock prices.

By contrast, Mr. Bernanke proposed various ways to fence off the troubled assets, from nonperforming loans to mortgage-backed securities that investors had stopped buying at almost any price.

Mr. Bernanke’s options included guarantees for bank assets, which was at the heart of the rescue packages for Bank of America and Citigroup. Citigroup received its rescue package in November, but it is expected to report additional losses on Friday that could top $10 billion.

In both of those deals, the federal government set up a complicated arrangement that would limit the banks’ losses on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of their worst assets.

Citigroup’s deal in November covered $300 billion in assets. Citigroup agreed to absorb the first $29 billion in losses. The Treasury agreed to take a second round of losses up to $5 billion, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation agreed to take a third round of losses of up to $10 billion. The Federal Reserve then agreed to lend Citigroup money at low interest rates for the value of the remaining assets.

As a second option, Mr. Bernanke and other Fed officials have proposed putting a bank’s impaired assets into a separate new “bad bank.” The effect would be much the same as providing a federal guarantee: the bank would be able to free itself from the need to set aside reserves for extra losses.

Both the idea of a government “wrap” and a government-backed “bad bank” have the virtue of protecting the bank’s common stockholders from being wiped out by the government.

By contrast, the Bush administration’s original approach to recapitalizing banks — injecting capital in exchange for preferred shares with warrants to convert to common stock — had the effect of squeezing out the common shares. That was because any losses would have to first wipe out common stockholders before the bank could stop paying dividends on preferred shares.

“One of the problems with TARP has been a result of the government not wanting to own the banks,” said Fred Cannon, chief equity strategist at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. “If you get losses, there is less common stock. What we are hopefully moving toward, to the extent that the government guarantees some of the assets, is a structure that protects common shareholders and allows the company to go out and raise common shares through the market.”

But a growing number of analysts warned that the approach may be too clever, because it gives policy makers too many ways to conceal true problems at banks and true risks to taxpayers.

“What we have is a weird, shadow nationalization,” said Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a consulting firm in Washington. “The government does not want to and should not want to own banks. But if they get forced into that situation, they should resolve that situation. Here, what you have is a huge diversified financial services industry with recognized losses and looming losses in every aspect of its operations. There’s nothing straightforward about it.”

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