占領(lǐng)運(yùn)動(dòng)最有力的統(tǒng)一因素是它清楚、簡(jiǎn)潔地指明了美國(guó)社會(huì)的關(guān)鍵問題：人口中絕大多數(shù)人，99%的人，與最富有、最有權(quán)勢(shì)的1%的人之間的分裂。

這個(gè)99%/1%的公式不只說(shuō)明了今天美國(guó)的收入不平等，它也說(shuō)明了1%的人在很大程度上已控制了政府并因此能夠操縱法律、稅收及規(guī)則以使其對(duì)自身有利。

如果你來(lái)看一下征富人的稅、管制華爾街、創(chuàng)造就業(yè)、通過削減赤字來(lái)優(yōu)化經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)或保留與保護(hù)社保、醫(yī)保等問題的民意調(diào)查，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，大多數(shù)人通常都一邊倒地反對(duì)緊縮并贊成“財(cái)富重分論者”的政策。

然而這個(gè)失效的政府看來(lái)沒有能力甚至不感興趣于去做能滿足這些大眾要求的任何事。相反，當(dāng)2008年金融危機(jī)來(lái)臨時(shí)，國(guó)會(huì)反應(yīng)神速，迅速撥出幾千億美元給那些銀行和其它企業(yè)，一點(diǎn)也不在乎赤字。

理論上，我們?cè)谄毕涿媲叭计降?，因此大眾能讓政治家替他們?lái)表達(dá)關(guān)注。但占領(lǐng)運(yùn)動(dòng)如火一般燃起，因數(shù)百萬(wàn)美國(guó)人認(rèn)識(shí)到，華盛頓的實(shí)際運(yùn)行方式與政治教科書上的解釋根本不是一回事。

那么，1%的這些人是如何做到這些的呢？

一個(gè)公司有、公司治、公司享的政府

政治學(xué)家謝爾頓·沃林（Sheldon Wolin）把美國(guó)稱為“逆向極權(quán)主義”的一個(gè)例子——在美國(guó)，公司凌駕于政府之上，投票只是唯一可接受的政治參與方式，民主被操縱于只產(chǎn)生政府與企業(yè)想要的結(jié)果。沃林認(rèn)為，公司操縱的媒體扮演的角色是控制民主，雖然它們自夸為自由媒體。

不可否認(rèn)的是，公司在政府中總是扮演一個(gè)主要角色。美國(guó)富豪的巨大財(cái)富中的大多數(shù)都是由資本家通過使用政府的權(quán)力來(lái)取得超過競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的優(yōu)勢(shì)或直接從公共資源中牟利而來(lái)。例如，鍍金時(shí)代（Gilded Age）的財(cái)閥，the Vanderbilts, the Astors, the Stewarts, the Goulds，在聯(lián)邦及國(guó)家1億美元補(bǔ)助及2億英畝聯(lián)邦土地補(bǔ)助的基礎(chǔ)上獲得了基于鐵路的財(cái)富。在今天的經(jīng)濟(jì)中，核能業(yè)及因特網(wǎng)都是政府實(shí)驗(yàn)室開發(fā)出來(lái)的技術(shù)私有化后的產(chǎn)物。

盡管自由市場(chǎng)空想家們大談“大政府”會(huì)抑制“大企業(yè)”，真相是大企業(yè)總是發(fā)現(xiàn)，為獲取能增加他們利潤(rùn)的政府政策，投資于政治家及其政黨是非常有用的。

因此，在1980年代的存貸危機(jī)中，國(guó)會(huì)在一個(gè)聽證會(huì)前盤問S&L crook Charles Keating時(shí)，一個(gè)代表問是否他認(rèn)為給政治家的幾千美元將買到影響，Keating 回答，“我肯定希望那樣。”

美國(guó)政治中的這兩個(gè)主要資本主義政黨在支持不同的行業(yè)領(lǐng)域時(shí)有特定的傾向：共和黨總體上得到石油與天然氣行業(yè)、農(nóng)業(yè)、軍工業(yè)的支持，民主黨從硅谷、好萊塢及華爾街獲取錢財(cái)。實(shí)際上，根據(jù)最近華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)的一篇報(bào)道，金融部門在2008年選舉期時(shí)為參選各方提供的資金占全部競(jìng)選費(fèi)用的30%。

但如果因此得出結(jié)論民主黨僅代表一個(gè)領(lǐng)域、一個(gè)聯(lián)盟或一個(gè)行業(yè)，共和黨代表另外一些，那就錯(cuò)了。

這種兩黨制的方法能確保美國(guó)企業(yè)間的界限都很特殊且不會(huì)固化入某一意識(shí)形態(tài)陣營(yíng)。企業(yè)必須學(xué)會(huì)在美國(guó)聯(lián)邦制內(nèi)運(yùn)作，這意味著企業(yè)在總統(tǒng)大選時(shí)可以是共和黨的捐贈(zèng)大戶，也可以是本地民主黨政治組織的捐助者。

第二，公司們喜歡增加他們的議價(jià)能力。他們想從他們的政治介入中獲取盡可能多的東西， 他們讓兩個(gè)黨相互斗爭(zhēng)。

最后，尋求政府支持的公司和投票人一樣，都喜歡“危害最小化”。國(guó)會(huì)里的多數(shù)黨通常都獲得競(jìng)選活動(dòng)的多數(shù)捐款。因?yàn)樗念I(lǐng)導(dǎo)者們將獲得國(guó)會(huì)的權(quán)力位置，有權(quán)立法，企業(yè)為保持自己的“門路”，將為他們捐款。

美國(guó)公司對(duì)他們的投資的期望是什么呢？2008年總統(tǒng)選舉總計(jì)花費(fèi)50多億美元。這看起來(lái)有點(diǎn)讓人驚愕，但事實(shí)上，它表明僅在四年的時(shí)間里總統(tǒng)選舉費(fèi)用已大幅增長(zhǎng)，等同于一家中等規(guī)模公司的股票市值。換名話說(shuō)，比Panera Bread公司的大，比Chipotle Mexican Grill公司的小。

實(shí)際上，最值得注意的是，對(duì)政治家們相對(duì)較小的的投資將如何為“投資者們”帶來(lái)巨大的回報(bào)。

相對(duì)于回報(bào)，這些投入都微不足道。軍工業(yè)從伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中獲得幾百億美元的回報(bào)，華爾街則從聯(lián)邦政府的救助中獲得數(shù)萬(wàn)億美元。2007年的一份研究分析了1979-2004年間公司捐獻(xiàn)與公司股價(jià)表現(xiàn)的關(guān)系，發(fā)現(xiàn)給政治候選人捐得最多的公司，其股價(jià)每年都比大盤平均高2.5%。

兩黨騙局

盡管從各行業(yè)、區(qū)域發(fā)出大量的反政府的聲音，統(tǒng)治階級(jí)還是需要一個(gè)資本主義國(guó)家來(lái)保證它的財(cái)產(chǎn)與權(quán)勢(shì)，以應(yīng)對(duì)其它資產(chǎn)階級(jí)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

只要這個(gè)政權(quán)的政黨仍效忠于這個(gè)國(guó)家，大企業(yè)可以遵守政府的改變。但為確保政府不頒布損害這些企業(yè)的政策，資本家們嘗試組建并控制為上臺(tái)執(zhí)政而競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的政黨。通過這種方法，資產(chǎn)階級(jí)可以協(xié)調(diào)解決目標(biāo)和計(jì)劃方面的沖突。

對(duì)資本家有利的政策不是來(lái)自于一些企業(yè)的陰謀，如共謀論者們斷言的那樣。它充斥于不同的私人基金與思想庫(kù)、大學(xué)、半公共機(jī)構(gòu)及政黨中。所有這些組織都從企業(yè)界招收專家來(lái)把公司的政策變成政府的政策。只要想一想如比爾.蓋茨與埃利·布羅德一樣的億萬(wàn)富豪設(shè)法通過“教育改革”來(lái)影響政府政策，就可明白他們的花樣之多了。

特別是，政府，作為執(zhí)行機(jī)構(gòu)，如同馬克思所說(shuō)，是“一個(gè)處理全體資產(chǎn)階級(jí)共同事務(wù)的委員會(huì)”，它的政策的目的是為了在短期經(jīng)濟(jì)與政治需求間、甚至在不同區(qū)域的資本間，尋求平衡。

在這個(gè)意義上，資本主義國(guó)家政權(quán)與其說(shuō)是資本家們手上的一個(gè)工具，不如說(shuō)是他們協(xié)調(diào)各方利益的場(chǎng)所。

民主黨與共和黨都效忠于資本主義并推進(jìn)美國(guó)的海外利益，這種觀點(diǎn)已不是什么新聞了。但資產(chǎn)階級(jí)什么也不會(huì)承認(rèn)。它對(duì)政黨們施加持續(xù)的壓力以確保它的利益能實(shí)現(xiàn)。在政黨與大企業(yè)間有無(wú)數(shù)的觸角相互聯(lián)系著，與此同時(shí)，公司影響力的兩個(gè)主要方面突顯出來(lái)：候選人選舉，公司游說(shuō)與政策建議。

美國(guó)選舉中的合法賄賂

馬克.漢納(Mark Hanna)，第一個(gè)現(xiàn)代政治捐款籌集人與確立人，他幫助共和黨在1896年完勝民主黨與平民黨，他曾說(shuō)：“政治中有兩件事很重要，第一是錢，我記不得第二是什么。”

一個(gè)當(dāng)今的類似人物是芝加哥市長(zhǎng)拉姆·伊曼紐爾（Raham Emanuel），他在進(jìn)入奧巴馬的白宮任辦公廳主任前負(fù)責(zé)民主黨國(guó)會(huì)競(jìng)選委員會(huì)。他授受DCCC記者采訪時(shí)曾說(shuō)過：“競(jìng)選中第一個(gè)三是錢錢錢，第二個(gè)三是錢錢媒（體），第三個(gè)三是票媒錢?！?/p>

任何人想成功競(jìng)選議員，需要花費(fèi)數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元。在2010年的國(guó)會(huì)選舉中，每位眾議員候選人的平均競(jìng)選費(fèi)用差不多是170萬(wàn)美元，每位參議員的平均競(jìng)選費(fèi)用是310萬(wàn)美元。每位任職參議員（incumbent senator）的競(jìng)選費(fèi)用則超過900萬(wàn)美元。

選舉費(fèi)用意味著主要的黨派都渴望得到富人與公司的資助。感謝最高法院對(duì)“聯(lián)合公民”（Citizens United)的判決把競(jìng)選開支等同于言論自由，我們有了非盈利的超級(jí)政治行動(dòng)委員會(huì) (Super PACs) ，它可從公司籌集數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元現(xiàn)金用于競(jìng)選，而不用透露捐獻(xiàn)者是誰(shuí)。

這種為美國(guó)政黨提供財(cái)政支持的有組織賄賂的制度，使任何欲挑戰(zhàn)當(dāng)前這種制度的人都無(wú)能為力。“任何期望能出現(xiàn)在超級(jí)政治行動(dòng)委員會(huì)名單上的候選人，都清楚地知道‘裁縫’的要求，如果不完全清除，也會(huì)避免任何平民主義傾向。”一位民主黨國(guó)會(huì)助手告訴記者亞歷山大.科克伯恩與肯.席爾瓦斯泰因?！斑@套規(guī)則不是對(duì)所有人都打開大門。候選人都有明確的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和條件?！?/p>

或許這就毫不奇怪了，2010年選出的眾議員新人中40%都是百萬(wàn)富翁。

即使民主黨從工會(huì)獲得了大把的捐獻(xiàn)，但仍改變不了公司捐款遠(yuǎn)多于工會(huì)捐款的事實(shí)。在2008年的選舉期間，民主黨僅從金融、保險(xiǎn)及房地產(chǎn)業(yè)收到的捐款就達(dá)8370萬(wàn)美元，這比從所有勞工與自由主義組織收到的錢全加起來(lái)的7990萬(wàn)美元還多。

狐貍們守著雞籠

一旦上臺(tái)，新政府就承受著大公司的持續(xù)壓力，使其只能采納對(duì)大公司有利的政策。

從1930年代起，貿(mào)易委員會(huì)(Business Council)，一個(gè)由美國(guó)主要大公司的總裁們組成的咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)，在每一屆政府中都扮演著有利于企業(yè)的政策的宣傳員及建議員的角色。所有的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)都要定期地咨詢這個(gè)委員會(huì)及其它組織，如經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展委員會(huì)。民主黨和共和黨政府都安排貿(mào)易委員會(huì)及經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展委員會(huì)的人到政府咨詢小組及政府行政職位上。

企業(yè)維持著這些類型的組織，以及其它如世界大型企業(yè)聯(lián)合會(huì)、美國(guó)商會(huì)及國(guó)家制造者協(xié)會(huì)( the Conference Board, the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers)等類組織，以便能獲得更多新的職位。這樣，他們的意圖就能通過被選出的政治家與執(zhí)行分支機(jī)構(gòu)提交給政府。

企業(yè)并不總能成功獲得他們所想要的一切，但它總能獲得它所能獲得的東西。

當(dāng)政治家們?cè)噲D在許多主題中的任何一個(gè)上制定一些政策時(shí)，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)智庫(kù)已作好準(zhǔn)備為他們提供建議了。一個(gè)特別拙劣的例子是前民主黨的參議員比爾.布拉德利，他代表新澤西，18家最大制藥公司中的10家在新澤西。布拉德利的演講是在“鸚鵡學(xué)舌，有時(shí)甚至一字不差地，照搬美國(guó)醫(yī)藥研究及制造商這個(gè)主要游說(shuō)團(tuán)體生產(chǎn)出來(lái)的的背景材料?！笨瓶瞬髋c席爾瓦斯泰因?qū)懙馈?/p>

同樣，華盛頓州的前鷹派參議員亨利.杰克遜，多年來(lái)一直以“波音參議員”聞名，他為他們州最大的軍火商的利益奔忙。如今，在國(guó)會(huì)中參議員Charles Schumer以“華爾街地鼠”聞名。

統(tǒng)計(jì)顯示，與投資競(jìng)選相比，企業(yè)投入更多的金錢與時(shí)間在游說(shuō)與辯護(hù)上。這是因?yàn)閷?duì)企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)真正的富礦出現(xiàn)在關(guān)閉的門后，常出現(xiàn)在法律、規(guī)定不可思議的細(xì)枝末節(jié)處。這里就是公司能獲得好處的地方，或者，同樣重要的是，改寫規(guī)則以支持他們的賺錢活動(dòng)，讓環(huán)境或消費(fèi)者見鬼去吧。

這就是為何法律或法規(guī)中的一條簡(jiǎn)單條款就可讓政治家的競(jìng)選承諾變得無(wú)意義。廣義上說(shuō)，這也是為何“我們這邊”總是完全失敗。在2001年布什政府“辯論”減稅法案時(shí)，國(guó)會(huì)巴結(jié)每一行業(yè)的游說(shuō)者，尋求他們的支持。與此同時(shí)，勞聯(lián)、產(chǎn)聯(lián)只有一位游說(shuō)者為這作了少量工作。

根據(jù)我們已知的這些，對(duì)12名國(guó)會(huì)“超級(jí)委員會(huì)”成員因建議削減聯(lián)邦赤字1.2萬(wàn)億美元而獲得更多捐款，或數(shù)千游說(shuō)者組織國(guó)會(huì)成員來(lái)對(duì)超級(jí)委員會(huì)施壓，有什么好奇怪的呢？

當(dāng)國(guó)會(huì)的多數(shù)黨由于選舉而改變時(shí)，游說(shuō)公司的人員及國(guó)會(huì)成員也會(huì)同時(shí)一起改變。如今，一個(gè)前保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)的游說(shuō)者擔(dān)任著籌款委員會(huì)（House Ways and Means）的職員主管，一位前洛克希德.馬丁公司的游說(shuō)者主管著拔款委員會(huì)（House Appropriations Committee）的職員。

所有這些，形成了一個(gè)行業(yè)“鐵三角”，國(guó)會(huì)及其執(zhí)行機(jī)構(gòu)，不管選舉結(jié)果如何，在很大程度上都是不可觸動(dòng)的。這保證了不管是哪個(gè)黨派被選舉上臺(tái)，大企業(yè)的利益總是被照顧。如今甚至更是這樣，因?yàn)橛握f(shuō)團(tuán)體與政府官員間的旋轉(zhuǎn)門已制度化了。

對(duì)企業(yè)老板來(lái)說(shuō)，這就是兩黨制的美妙之處。如果一個(gè)黨失去選民的喜愛，總有另一個(gè)黨——準(zhǔn)備好政策——等在旁邊。

中云譯，2011-11-2

*Lance Selfa, 《The Democrats: A Critical History》一書的作者。本文原題：How the 1 percent rules，發(fā)于socialistworkers.org, 2011-10-26

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自由市場(chǎng)的神話
Dean Baker

華盛頓那些真正的大人物（Very Serious People）正忙于尋找一種創(chuàng)造性的方法，以從中產(chǎn)階級(jí)與中等收入家庭身上削減社保、醫(yī)保并拿走其它福利。問題是我們?cè)僖膊荒艹惺芩麄兊倪@種行為了。

這個(gè)故事有兩點(diǎn)可讓我們其它人發(fā)狂。難于判斷哪一點(diǎn)讓人更憤怒。

第一，我們知道這個(gè)國(guó)家有許多人富得不可思議。如伊麗莎白.沃倫委婉地提醒我們的，他們的財(cái)富全都不是靠他們自己得來(lái)的。但沃倫教授在她的估計(jì)中實(shí)際上是過于寬宏大量了。

雖然有不少富人是通過努力工作、聰明或有創(chuàng)造性而取得成功的，但許多真正的富人是直接或間接地通過政府的大手在場(chǎng)上偏向于他們而賺大錢的。他們的努力工作包括操縱規(guī)則以確保自己能成為最終的最大贏家。

在任何一個(gè)地方都比不上在華爾街能更好地看清這一點(diǎn)。華爾街塞滿了千萬(wàn)、億萬(wàn)富翁，他們通過利用他們的“大到不倒”的銀行、用政府擔(dān)保的存款進(jìn)行賭博、敲詐國(guó)家及地方政府的養(yǎng)老金管理費(fèi)、以及政府?dāng)?shù)萬(wàn)億美元的、利率遠(yuǎn)低于市場(chǎng)水平的救助金等等，來(lái)使自己處于財(cái)富的頂端。這些人清楚地知道政府的角色，然而他們卻假裝這是一個(gè)完全自由的市場(chǎng)。

但銀行不是唯一操縱規(guī)則的人。醫(yī)藥公司從政府授予的專利壟斷權(quán)中大量獲利。藥品通常都很便宜，這就是為什么可在藥品連鎖店買到數(shù)百種5-6美元/處方的普藥。因有專利保護(hù)，醫(yī)藥公司的專利藥能賣數(shù)百或甚至數(shù)千美元/處方。結(jié)果，我們每年花了差不多3000億美元（每人約1000美元）在藥上，在一個(gè)“真正的”自由市場(chǎng)里這大約應(yīng)只是300億美元/年。

政府也通過其它方式為有錢、有權(quán)的人搭建平臺(tái)。在當(dāng)前強(qiáng)制性的勞動(dòng)法下，政府如無(wú)數(shù)磚塊一樣壓迫著下面任何敢違反規(guī)則的工會(huì)——如舉行非法罷工。與此相反，公司甚至能逃避最臭名昭著的違反勞動(dòng)法之類的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)打擊。

我們的貿(mào)易政策被設(shè)計(jì)來(lái)把工資壓力向下壓到這個(gè)國(guó)家大多數(shù)勞動(dòng)者的身上，把他們置于與發(fā)展中國(guó)家低工資工人的直接競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中。由于美元的高估值，這種影響被加劇。同時(shí)，那些相對(duì)有特權(quán)的一些職業(yè)，如醫(yī)生和律師，仍很大程度上地被保護(hù)于國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)之外。

富人們?cè)O(shè)計(jì)規(guī)則以確保能保住財(cái)富并變得更富的方法可列得很長(zhǎng)。但那些真正的大人物正打算削減老年人社保及失業(yè)者醫(yī)療補(bǔ)助，而Countrywide的安吉洛.莫齊洛與花旗集團(tuán)的羅伯特.魯賓卻仍非常富有，這一事實(shí)就是公眾該對(duì)那些掌權(quán)的人憤怒的第一原因。

第二，當(dāng)前低迷的原因。我們之所以有2600萬(wàn)人失業(yè)、未就業(yè)或未在職，不是因?yàn)槲覀兏F，而是因?yàn)槲覀兏?。我們的?jīng)濟(jì)面臨的直接問題不是產(chǎn)品與資源太少，而是需求太少。這就是使華爾街占領(lǐng)者及任何其他人對(duì)我們國(guó)家的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者們完全憤怒的原因。

如果人們口袋里有更多的錢，那么他們就會(huì)買更多的產(chǎn)品與服務(wù)，公司就會(huì)雇更多的人去生產(chǎn)這些產(chǎn)品與服務(wù)，我們也就會(huì)有更多的工作。這個(gè)國(guó)家正經(jīng)歷的失業(yè)與貧困完全是政治失敗的結(jié)果。

如果聯(lián)邦政府增加在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施上的投入，讓十多歲的孩子有打掃街道之類的工作，讓州及當(dāng)?shù)卣绣X給老師及消防隊(duì)員并鼓勵(lì)雇主縮短工作時(shí)間而不是解雇工人，我們將能很快讓經(jīng)濟(jì)重回完全就業(yè)狀態(tài)。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們知道這些已有70多年了，但不知何故，創(chuàng)造就業(yè)在華盛頓并沒排在削減社保及醫(yī)保之前。

簡(jiǎn)而言之，我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)制度，即使當(dāng)它在有效運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)時(shí)，它也被操縱于將財(cái)富分給富人。我們的政治制度，在巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)時(shí)，它更集中于削弱對(duì)工薪家庭的支持而不是修復(fù)經(jīng)濟(jì)。難于理解為何每個(gè)人不去占領(lǐng)華爾街。

*Dean Baker是一位宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家及華盛頓經(jīng)濟(jì)政策研究中心的董事之一。之前他在Bucknell大學(xué)工作。他也是Truthout的專欄作家。本文發(fā)在socialistworker.org網(wǎng)。

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How the 1 percent rules
Lance Selfa, author of The Democrats: A Critical History explains how the 1 percent has rigged the supposedly democratic political system so they're always the winners.

October 26, 2011

THE OCCUPY movement's most powerful unifying factor has been its clear and simple identification of the key problem in American society: the divide between the vast majority of the population--the 99 percent--and the richest and most powerful 1 percent.

This 99 percent/1 percent formulation isn't just a statement about income inequality in the U.S. today. It's also an acknowledgement that the 1 percent largely controls the government and is therefore able to rig laws, taxes and regulations in its favor.

If you look at opinion polls on questions like taxing the rich, regulating Wall Street, spending money on jobs, prioritizing economic growth over cutting the deficit or preserving and protecting Social Security and Medicare, you'll find popular, often lopsided, majorities opposed to austerity and in favor of "redistributionist" policies.

Yet the dysfunctional government seems incapable--and not even much interested--in doing much of anything to meet these popular demands. By contrast, Congress acted with tremendous speed--and with little regard for the deficit--to appropriate hundreds of billions of dollars for the banks and other corporations when the financial crisis struck in 2008.

In theory, we're all equal at the ballot box, and so popular majorities should be able to force politicians to address their concerns. But the Occupy movement has caught fire because millions of Americans realize that the way Washington works in reality bears no resemblance to the political science textbook explanations.

So how does the 1 percent get away with it?

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A government of, by and for the corporations

The political scientist Sheldon Wolin has gone so far as to call the U.S. an example of "inverted totalitarianism"--where corporations dominate the government, voting is the only acceptable political participation, and democracy is "managed" to produce only results that the government and corporations want. To Wolin, the corporate-controlled media play a role in helping to manage democracy, even behind its conceit of being a free press.

It's undeniable that corporations play a major role in government--and always have. Most great American fortunes were made by capitalists who used the power of government to gain advantages over competitors or to profit from public resources. For example, the Gilded Age plutocrats--the Vanderbilts, the Astors, the Stewarts, the Goulds--built their railroad-based fortunes on the foundation of $100 million in federal and state grants and 200 million acres of federal land grants. In today's economy, the nuclear power industry and the Internet are both products of the privatization of technologies developed in government laboratories.

Despite the free-market ideologues' rhetoric about "big government" pitted against "big business," the truth is that big business has always found it useful to invest in politicians and their political parties to win government policies that improve their bottom lines.

Thus, during the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis, Congress hauled S&L crook Charles Keating before a hearing and one representative asked if he thought the thousands of dollars he had given to politicians was to buy influence. Keating answered, "I sure hope so."

The two main pro-capitalist parties in U.S. politics have certain tendencies of supporting different industrial sectors: Republicans generally win the support of the oil and gas industry, agribusiness and defense, and Democrats rack up money from Silicon Valley, Hollywood and Wall Street. In fact, according to a recent Wall Street Journal report, the financial sector accounted for 30 percent of all spending on all sides during the 2008 election cycle.

Still, it would be misleading to conclude the Democrats simply represent one section or coalition of business, while Republicans represent another.

The operation of the two-party system assures that these divisions within American business are ad hoc and don't congeal into permanent ideological camps. Business must learn to operate within the U.S. federal system, which means that industries that may be big Republican donors at the presidential level support, but also contributors to local Democratic political machines.

Secondly, corporations like to increase their bargaining power. They want to get as much as they can from their political involvement, and it helps them to play one party off against the other.

Finally, corporations seeking government favors subscribe to "lesser evilism" as much as voters do. The majority party in Congress is usually assured a majority of campaign contributions as well. Since its leaders will be in positions of authority in Congress, with the power to advance legislation, business will contribute in order to maintain their "access."

What does Corporate America expect for its investment? In total, the 2008 presidential election cost somewhere north of $5 billion. While this seems like a staggering sum--and, indeed, it represents a huge increase in the cost of the presidential election in just four years--it is equivalent to the size of an average "mid-cap" company, as measured by the value of all its stock. In other words, larger than Panera Bread, but smaller than Chipotle Mexican Grill.

In fact, what's most notable is how a relatively small investment in politicians will bring big returns for the "investors."

For what amounts to peanuts, the defense industry won tens of billions in business from the Iraq war, and Wall Street scored trillions from the federal government's bailout. A 2007 study analyzing corporate donations and company stock performance between 1979 and 2004 found that corporations which contributed the most to political candidates had stock prices that beat the overall stock market by an average of 2.5 percentage points annually.

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The two-party swindle

Despite much anti-government rhetoric that emanates from business sectors, the ruling class needs a capitalist state to guarantee its property and its influence against rival capitalist classes.

As long as the regime's political parties remain committed to maintaining that state, big business can abide changes in government. But to assure that governments don't enact policies that work too much to the detriment of business, the capitalists attempt to shape and control the political parties that regularly compete to run the government. This is one way by which the capitalist class mediates conflicting goals and agendas.

Pro-capitalist policy doesn't come from some business cabal, as conspiracy theorists allege. It flows through different private foundations and think tanks, universities, quasi-public agencies and the political parties. All of these recruit professionals from the corporate sector who are groomed to carry corporate policy into government. Just think of the many ways in which billionaires like Bill Gates and Eli Broad have managed to influence government policy on "school reform."

The government--and in particular, the executive branch acting as what Karl Marx called "a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie"--pursues policies that balance between short-term economic and political needs, and even between sections of capital.

In this sense, the capitalist state is less of a tool in the hands of capitalists as an arena in which capitalist interests are mediated.

The idea that Democrats and Republicans are committed to capitalism and to advancing U.S. interests overseas is hardly news. But the capitalist class takes nothing for granted. It exerts constant pressure on the political parties to assure that its interests are carried out. While there are numerous tentacles that tie the parties to big business, two major areas of corporate influence stand out: candidate selection, and corporate lobbying and policy advice.

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Legal graft in U.S. elections

Mark Hanna, the first modern political fundraiser and fixer who helped the Republicans sweep to a landslide victory in 1896 over the Democrats and Populists, once said: "There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money, and I can't remember what the second one is."

A modern-day equivalent might be Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, who ran the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee before advancing to chief of staff in Barack Obama's White House. He once reportedly told DCCC staffers: "The first third of your campaign is money, money, money. The second third is money, money and press. And the last third is votes, press and money."

Anyone hoping to mount a successful campaign for national office needs millions of dollars. In the 2010 congressional election, the average House candidate spent almost $1.7 million for his or her seat. The average senator spent $3.1 million. The average incumbent senator running for reelection spent over $9 million.

The expense of electioneering means that both major parties look to wealthy individuals and corporations for their funding. And thanks to the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision equating campaign spending with free speech, we have the rise of Super PACs--non-profits that can collect millions in corporate cash to spend on campaigns without disclosing their donors.

The system of organized bribery that finances American political parties assures that no one who might challenge this status quo becomes a serious contender. "Any candidate that expects to show up on the PAC lists is well aware of the need to tailor, if not eliminate, any populist leanings," a Democratic congressional aide told investigative journalists Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein. "It's not a formula that opens the door to any but establishment candidates."

Perhaps it's no surprise, then, that 40 percent of House freshmen elected in 2010 are millionaires.

Even the fact that Democrats gain the bulk of contributions from labor unions doesn't change the fact that corporate money swamps labor money. In the 2008 election cycle, the Democrats collected more money from just the finance, insurance and real estate industries ($83.7 million) than from all labor and liberal organizations combined ($79.9 million).

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Foxes guarding the chicken coop

Once in office, administrations are subject to constant pressure from big business to adopt pro-corporate policies.

Since the 1930s, the Business Council, an advisory organization composed of chief executive officers of major U.S. corporations, has acted as a sounding board and proponent for pro-business policies within every presidential administration. All U.S. presidents have regularly consulted the Council and other organizations, like the Committee for Economic Development (CED). Democratic and Republican administrations have appointed Council and CED members to government advisory panels and to government administrative positions.

Business sustains these kinds of organizations--along with others like the Conference Board, the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers--to be able to develop class-wide positions on a range if issues. These can then be presented to the government through elected politicians and through executive branch agencies.

Business isn't always successful in getting everything it wants, but it always gets what it can.

When politicians seek to develop policies on any one of a number of topics, they find business think tanks ready to offer advice. One particularly crude example was that of former Democratic Sen. Bill Bradley, who represented New Jersey when it played host to 10 of the largest 18 pharmaceutical companies. Bradley's speeches "parrot[ed], sometimes virtually verbatim, background material produced by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the industry's chief lobbying group," wrote Cockburn and Silverstein.

Likewise, hawkish former Sen. Henry Jackson of Washington state was for years known as the "senator from Boeing" because of his devotion to the interests of his state's largest military contractor. Today, Sen. Charles Schumer is known as Wall Street's gopher in Congress.

The statistics show that business devotes more money and time to lobbying and advocacy than it does to electioneering. This is because the real bonanza for companies takes place behind closed doors, often in the arcane minutiae of legislation and regulations. Here is where companies can get favors for themselves, or--equally as important--rewrite regulations to support their profit-making endeavors, the environment or consumers be damned.

This is where a single line in legislation or regulations can undo or render meaningless any politician's campaign promises. It's also the place where "our side," broadly defined, is completely overmatched. During the 2001 "debate" on the Bush administration's tax cut legislation, Capitol Hill was crawling with lobbyists from every conceivable industry, seeking favorable treatment. At the same time, the AFL-CIO had one lobbyist working quarter-time on this.

Given what we know, is it any surprise that the 12 members of the congressional "super-committee" charged with proposing $1.2 trillion in cuts to the federal deficit have seen increased contributions to their coffers? Or that thousands of lobbyists are organizing members of Congress to pressure the super-committee?

When elections change the congressional majority, there is a parallel changing of the guard in lobbying firms and congressional staffs. So today, there's a former lobbyist for the Securities Industry Association serving as staff director for the House Ways and Means committee--and a former lobbyist for Lockheed Martin running the staff of the House Appropriations Committee.

All of this helps to create what's been called an "iron triangle" of industry, Congress and the executive branch, which remains largely intact regardless of election results. It assures that no matter which party is officially in power, big business' interests will be attended to. This is even more assured today, as a revolving door between lobbying groups and government officials becomes institutionalized.

For industry bosses, this is the beauty of the two-party system. If one party falls out of favor with the voters, there's always the other one--with predictable policies--waiting in the wings.

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