“美國發動非常規戰的意圖在于,通過發展和維持抵抗力量,乘機利用敵國在政治、軍事、經濟以及心理上的弱點,完成美國的戰略目標……在可預見的未來,美軍將主要從事非常規戰。”
這就是2010年《美國陸軍特種部隊非常規戰手冊》(TC 18-01)的開頭。該手冊是一份暫行出版物,用以解決非常規戰的定義問題,及其學說中存在的其他一些前后矛盾的問題。新的非常規戰文件(ATP 3-05.1)尚為初期草案,還無法獲取,不過,有消息稱,該文件可能和TC 18-01手冊大體相同。
但是,我們大多數人都無緣翻閱這份真實揭秘美國是如何發動骯臟戰爭的計劃藍圖。這些秘密戰爭既沒有經過國會的批準,也沒有獲得那些因手冊指令而受害的目標國人民的同意。
該文件引用1962年約翰•肯尼迪總統的講話作為開頭。這短短的幾行字便闡明了華盛頓的核心理念,即美國軍隊有權進行破壞穩定、滲透、暗殺以及顛覆的行動——這一切完全服從于那些有待商榷的外交政策目的,毫不考慮主權國家是否有作戰準備,或是否有改變意愿:
“存在著另外一種戰爭,它具有全新的戰爭強度,但實際上古已有之,那就是通過游擊隊、顛覆和叛亂分子以及刺客進行作戰;以埋伏代替搏斗,以滲透代替侵略;以削弱和疲憊敵人代替同敵人直接交戰,以此尋求戰爭勝利。總之,以亂取勝。”
目標:中東
布什主義確立了一條原則,即對將來有一天可能威脅到美國利益的國家先發制人的原則,由此,為非常規戰主流化鋪平了道路。對于如何評估這些威脅,布什主義并未提供任何特定的標準,也沒有試圖去解釋為什么美國之外的其他國家應該為美國“利益”負責——無論是商業利益、安全利益還是政治利益。
布什主義基本上沒有引起過爭議。在過去十年里,它給中東地區帶來了災難性后果,因而氣數已盡。非常規戰的主要目標傳統上一直是反對美國在中東地區稱霸的國家和團體——主要是抵抗軸心(Resistance Axis),包括伊朗、敘利亞、真主黨和哈馬斯——但事實上,任何國家,只要抵抗軸心對其具有一定影響力,都在某種程度上遭遇了美國的非常規戰。
非常規戰最邪惡的地方——除明顯違背了國際法有關主權、領土完整以及人類生命或財產損失等條款外——在于發起富有侵略性的心理攻勢,煽動一國民眾反對自己的政府。正是在這一點上,非常規戰不符合任何一個美國人的價值標準。
2011年發生的阿拉伯之春使這一地區紛爭和內部混亂之中,這為美國加強在“敵對”國的非常規戰提供了絕佳機會,而毫不在乎這些國家的民眾是否想要尋求政權更迭。伊朗、敘利亞和利比亞就是最好的例子——他們去年都是非常規戰的目標,只是遭到滲透的程度不同,造成的結果也有顯著差異。
以下取自《特種部隊非常規戰手冊》,其展示了作戰初期的行動范疇:
1. 游擊活動
? 開展大規模的游擊活動
? 開展小規模的游擊活動
2. 準備抵抗骨干、動員民眾
? 增加政治暴力事件和陰謀破壞
? 嚴重削弱(政府、管理部門、警方和軍隊的)士氣
? 增加秘密活動以顯示抵抗組織的力量和政府的虛弱
? 向政府公開和秘密施加壓力
? 加強宣傳力度;為民眾叛亂做好心理準備
? 擴大陣線組織
? 建立國家陣線組織和解放運動組織;爭取國外的同情者
? 向國家所有部門擴散顛覆組織
? 滲透到工會、學生和國家組織及社會各個階層
? 雇傭反對派骨干,并組織培訓
? 開展國外組織者和顧問的滲透,及國外宣傳、物資、資金、武器以及裝備的滲透
? 增加焦慮、不安和不滿情緒;向管理機構、警方、軍隊以及國家組織進行滲透。組織抵制、怠工抗議和罷工活動
3. 秘密行動
? 引發騷亂;制造有利的公眾輿論(擁護國家事業);制造對現有政府的不信任
? 通過輿論宣傳和政治心理攻勢使政府失去信任,從而制造更大范圍的不滿
? 挑起對政治、經濟、社會、管理及其他條件的不滿;煽動民族意氣(獨立),或對意識形態及其他方面改變的愿望
按照計劃,2月14日本來應在伊朗展開非常規戰。但是,在經歷2009年伊朗總統選舉帶來的政權動蕩后,伊朗伊斯蘭共和國從中吸取了教訓,已經有所警惕。
利用社會化媒體來配合伊朗大選后的抗議活動,廣泛散布反政府言論,標志著全球互聯網革命時代的到來。五角大樓不失時機地稱賽博空間是“操作域”,并在去年大幅增加了用于從事網絡顛覆活動的預算撥款。
去年7月,美國國防部的技術部門美國國防先進項目研究局(DARPA)宣布推行一項價值4200萬美元的計劃,以使美國軍隊能夠“進行情報監測、分類、評估以及跟蹤,在社會化媒體領域制造并傳播思想和理念(文化基因)”。
《連線》雜志將這項計劃稱為五角大樓的“社會化媒體宣傳機器”,因為該計劃旨在“偵查對手的情報,阻止其產生影響”。
為了能夠“更加靈活地利用支持(軍事)行動的信息”,進而“抵御”“不良后果”,該計劃將實現自動“識別參與者和意圖、評估競選游說活動的效果”,最后,在必要時候,滲入海外基于社會化媒體的選戰活動,并改變活動方向。
在伊朗的非常規戰行動似乎或多或少還停留在技術破壞、社交化媒體的滲透和暗殺行動上。利比亞則處在另一個極端——下面給出了非常規戰手冊針對利比亞的行動方案:
第一階段:準備
反對派和外國贊助商實施心理攻勢,將反對現行政府或占領國的群體團結起來,使其做好準備,接受美國的支持。
第二階段:初步接觸
美國政府(USG)機構協調流亡政府同盟或反對派領導層,提供其所需的美國支持。
第三階段:滲透
派出特種部隊滲入目標地區,與其基地建立聯系,并和反對派進行接觸。
第四階段:組織
特種部隊組織、訓練反對派骨干,并為其提供裝備,重點是發展秘密機構。
第五階段:積聚力量
特種部隊協助骨干發展影響力大的抵抗組織,可執行少量戰斗行動,但重點仍是積聚力量。
第六階段:行動
非常規部隊執行戰斗行動,直到與常規部隊結合或戰事平息。
第七階段:過渡
非常規部隊或收歸國家控制,或轉變為常規部隊,亦或遣散。
當然,針對利比亞采取的方案還稍有不同,因為它是以北約作為掩飾,美國軍隊在背后指揮。此外,這次大規模非常規戰行動取得成功,更多依靠的不是地面作戰,而是空中掩護和利比亞叛軍大部分進攻的情報共享。
目標:在敘利亞發動政變
非常規戰的敘利亞模式將會是伊朗和利比亞兩者的結合。由于一份2006年維基解密電報揭密了敘利亞總統巴沙爾•阿薩德的國內聲望和實力,非常規戰將必然需要以一些顛覆民眾觀念的活動開始,才能逐漸轉變為“利比亞模式”。
正如維基解密電報建議的那樣,要抓住“機會”適時曝光敘利亞政權的弱點,制造教派或民族分裂,挑起軍事或安全機構內部不和,造成經濟困難,非常規戰也指示特種部隊要“發掘敵國在政治、軍事、經濟以及心理上的弱點”。
敘利亞的人群特征在非常規戰手冊中被如此描述:“在幾乎所有情形下,抵抗運動都要面對一小群積極支持政府的人,和同樣一小群支持抵抗運動的激進派。抵抗若想取得成功,必須爭取中立的中間群體……使其接受反對派為合法組織。被動群體有時候恰恰是在獲得有力支持的叛亂中奪取政權的關鍵。”
要將“中間群體”轉變為叛亂的支持者,非常規戰建議,“通過輿論宣傳和政治心理攻勢使政府失去信任,從而制造更大范圍的不滿”。
隨著沖突升級,“宣傳力度,煽動人群叛亂的心理攻勢”也應加強。
首先,要制造地區性甚至全國性的“騷亂”——組織抵制、罷工以及其他煽動不滿情緒的活動。接著,“展開國外組織者和顧問的滲透,以及國外宣傳、物資、資金、武器及裝備的滲透”。
下一步行動將是,建立“國民陣線組織(即敘利亞全國委員會)和解放運動組織(即敘利亞自由軍)”,這將使更多的人群接受“日益增加的政治暴力和陰謀破壞”——同時鼓勵指導個人或團體在市中心實施破壞行為。”
那么大部分中立人群(表面上是愛好和平的)對反對派帶來的暴力將會作何反應呢?非常規戰手冊告訴我們操縱方法很簡單:
“如果目標政府發動反擊,那么反對派就可以強調反對派作為“民眾“代表所做出的犧牲和遇到的困難,乘機利用負面結果來博取更多人的同情和支持。如果目標政府反擊無效或沒有出現反擊,那么反對派就可以以此為依據,證明自己有能力對抗和戰勝敵人。此外,反對派還可以回敬敵人,將其描繪成“無能”和“勉強”的形象,從而使敵軍士氣低落,萌生必敗的想法。”
諸如此類。
布什主義如今在巴拉克•奧巴馬總統的統治下換上了新的“外衣”。然而,無論是在近期新成立的“防暴委員會(Atrocity Prevention Board)”的指導下,還是以“人道主義干預”作為幌子,其目的始終沒有改變過——破壞他國穩定,以謀求本國政治經濟霸權,即“美國利益”。
當阿拉伯各國政府大喊“外國陰謀”時,無論政府領導人受歡迎與否,他們的判斷無疑是正確的。事實上,在主要的阿拉伯國家里,從聽起來無傷大雅的“民間團體”,到美國資助的非政府組織(NGOs),再從軍事或情報機構到普通市民的臉譜頁面,已經沒有什么領域是美國“利益”尚未觸碰到的。
《丑陋的美國人》只是變得更加丑陋。在中東地區掀起的這些叛亂中,任何一個阿拉伯人,只要他沒有還擺脫被外國滲透的危險,都正在成為針對本國的非常規戰的排頭兵。
原文鏈接:
http://globalciviliansforpeace.com/2012/05/28/going-rogue-americas-unconventional-warfare-in-the-mideast/
原文:
Going Rogue: America’s Unconventional Warfare in the Mideast
Posted on May 28, 2012 by globalciviliansforpeace
Al Akbar
By Sharmine Narwani – Fri, 2012-05-25
‘The intent of U.S. [Unconventional Warfare] UW efforts is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives…For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will predominantly engage in irregular warfare (IW) operations.‘
So begins the 2010 Unconventional Warfare (UW) Manual of the US Military’s Special Forces. The manual attached here (TC 18-01) is an interim publication, developed to address the definition of Unconventional Warfare and some other inconsistencies in UW Doctrine. The new UW document (ATP 3-05.1) is in the initial draft and not yet available, though sources tell me it is unlikely to differ much from TC 18-01.
But most of us have not had the pleasure of leafing through this truly revelatory blueprint that shows how America wages its dirty wars. These are the secret wars that have neither been approved by Congress, nor by the inhabitants of nations whose lives – if not bodies – are mauled by the directives on these pages.
A quote from President John F. Kennedy in 1962 opens the document. These few lines illustrate a core Washington belief that US forces have the right to destabilize, infiltrate, assassinate, subvert – all in service of questionable foreign policy objectives, with no evident consideration of a sovereign state’s preparedness or desire for change:
There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest.
Target: Middle East
The Bush Doctrine paved the way for the mainstreaming of unconventional warfare by establishing the principle of pre-emptive actions against a state that may one day pose a threat to American interests. It didn’t offer any specific criteria to gauge those threats, nor did it attempt to explain why anyone outside the United States should be held accountable for US “interests” – be they commercial, security or political.
The doctrine went largely unchallenged, and has been played out with disastrous results throughout the Middle East in the past decade. The prime targets of UW have traditionally been nations and groups that oppose US primacy in the region – mainly the Resistance Axis consisting of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas – but UW has been carried out to some degree in virtually any nation where this Axis carries some influence.
The most nefarious aspect of UW – aside from the obvious violations of international law pertaining to sovereignty, territorial integrity and loss of human life/property, etc – is the proactive and aggressive effort to psychologically sway a population against its government. It is at this entry point where UW fails every American test of “values.”
The Arab Intifadas of 2011 provided a unique opportunity – amidst regional and sometimes domestic chaos – to ramp up UW activities in “hostile” states, whether or not populations sought regime change. Prime examples are Iran, Syria and Libya – all of which have been UW targets in the past year, at different levels of infiltration and with markedly different results.
Here is a chart from the Special Forces UW manual that demonstrates the scope of activity at the early stages:
February 14 was supposed to be the kick-off in Iran, but the Islamic Republic was already on guard, having gained experience with UW subversion in the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian presidential elections.
The use of social media to coordinate protests and widely disseminate anti-regime narratives in Iran’s post-election period marked a new era in the internet revolution globally. The Pentagon lost no time in claiming cyberspace as an “operational domain” and in the past year has substantially increased its budgetary allocation to subversion activities on the web.
Last July – as I wrote in this article - the technology arm of the Department of Defense, DARPA, announced a $42 million program to enable the U.S. military to “detect, classify, measure and track the formation, development and spread of ideas and concepts (memes)” within social media.
Wired magazine calls the project the Pentagon’s “social media propaganda machine” because of its plans for “counter messaging of detected adversary influence operations.”
In order to “allow more agile use of information in support of [military] operations” and “defend” against “adverse outcomes,” the project will enable the automation of processes to “identify participants and intent, measure effects of persuasion campaigns,” and ultimately, infiltrate and redirect social media-based campaigns overseas, when deemed necessary.
The UW campaign in Iran appears to more or less have faltered at technology sabotage, social media infiltration and assassinations. Libya is at the other extreme – and the following chart gives a bird’s eye view of the UW manual’s playbook for operations of that magnitude.
The Libyan scenario of course was slightly different in that it was conducted under NATO cover, with the US military “leading from behind.” In addition, the large-scale UW operation’s success relied less on ground combat than on air cover and intelligence-sharing for attacks conducted largely by Libyan rebels.
Target: Regime Change in Syria
In Syria, the UW task would have been a mix of the two. Because of the domestic popularity and strength of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad revealed here in a 2006 Wikileaks Cable, UW activities would necessarily need to start with some subversion of the population before graduating to a Libyan-style scenario.
Just as the Wikileaks cable recommends identifying “opportunities” to expose “vulnerabilities” in the Syrian regime and cause sectarian/ethnic division, discord within the military/security apparatus and economic hardship, the UW manual also instructs special forces to “exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities.”
The Syrian demographic landscape is reflected in the UW manual: “In almost every scenario, resistance movements face a population with an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction supporting the resistance movement. For the resistance to succeed, it must convince the uncommitted middle population…to accept it as a legitimate entity. A passive population is sometimes all a well-supported insurgency needs to seize political power.”
To turn the “uncommitted middle population” into supporting insurgency, UW recommends the “creation of atmosphere of wider discontent through propaganda and political and psychological efforts to discredit the government.”
As conflict escalates, so should the “intensification of propaganda; psychological preparation of the population for rebellion.”
First, there should be local and national “agitation” – the organization of boycotts, strikes, and other efforts to suggest public discontent. Then, the “infiltration of foreign organizers and advisors and foreign propaganda, material, money, weapons and equipment.”
The next level of operations would be to establish “national front organizations [i.e. the Syrian National Council] and liberation movements [i.e. the Free Syrian Army]” that would move larger segments of the population toward accepting “increased political violence and sabotage” – and encourage the mentoring of “individuals or groups that conduct acts of sabotage in urban centers.”
Now, how and why would an uncommitted – and ostensibly peaceful – majority of the population respond to the introduction of violence by opposition groups? The UW manual tells us there is an easy way to spin this one:
If retaliation [by the target government] occurs, the resistance can exploit the negative consequences to garner more sympathy and support from the population by emphasizing the sacrifices and hardship the resistance is enduring on behalf of “the people.” If retaliation is ineffective or does not occur, the resistance can use this as proof of its ability to wage effect combat against the enemy. In addition, the resistance can portray the inability or reluctance of the enemy to retaliate as a weakness, which will demoralize enemy forces and instill a belief in their eventual defeat.
And so on, and so forth.
The Bush Doctrine today has morphed under President Barack Obama into new “packaging.” Whether under the guidance of the recently-created “Atrocity Prevention Board” or trussed up as “humanitarian intervention,” the goals remain the same – destabilization of lives and nations in the service of political and economic domination, i.e., “American interests.”
When Arab governments yell “foreign conspiracy,” whether or not they are popular leaders they are surely right. There are virtually no domains left in key Arab countries – from the innocuous-sounding “civil society” filled to the brim with US-funded NGOs to the military/intelligence apparatuses of these nations to the Facebook pages of ordinary citizens – that are untouched by American “interests.”
The Ugly American just got uglier. And within these intifadas raging in the region, any Arab population that does not shut itself off from this foreign infiltration risks becoming a foot soldier in an unconventional war against themselves.
(《環球視野globalview.cn》第512期)
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