摘要：我們正在見證“舊秩序的危機(jī)”。各發(fā)達(dá)國家都面臨著類似的問題：負(fù)擔(dān)過重的福利國家，老齡化的人口，以及日益低迷的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。這些情況構(gòu)成了此次全球危機(jī)的特點(diǎn)，也解釋了危機(jī)為何會同時降臨在美國、歐洲和日本。

【美國《華盛頓郵報》7月23日文章】題：經(jīng)濟(jì)艱難時期的背后是對新秩序的擔(dān)憂（作者該報專欄作家羅伯特•薩繆爾森）

我們正在見證“舊秩序的危機(jī)”。各發(fā)達(dá)國家都面臨著類似的問題：負(fù)擔(dān)過重的福利國家，老齡化的人口，以及日益低迷的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。這些情況構(gòu)成了此次全球危機(jī)的特點(diǎn)，也解釋了危機(jī)為何會同時降臨在美國、歐洲和日本。

二戰(zhàn)后由大部分民主國家構(gòu)建的舊秩序依托于三大支柱。其一是福利國家。政府會保護(hù)失業(yè)人員、老人、殘疾人和窮人。其二是對經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張的信心；這會提高人們的生活水平，同時允許收入再分配。最后，全球貿(mào)易和金融滿足了各國的共同利益。

現(xiàn)在，這三大支柱都搖搖欲墜。可以肯定地說，金融危機(jī)使得形勢雪上加霜，而每個國家又面臨不同的處境。美國的國家福利不如德國豐厚。希臘開始出現(xiàn)危機(jī)是因?yàn)槠洳m報了大量預(yù)算赤字；愛爾蘭的危機(jī)始于房地產(chǎn)泡沫的破裂，引發(fā)了耗資巨大的銀行救助行動。但這些差異掩蓋了明顯的相似之處。

先從福利國家說起。這對很多人來說是一大恩惠，但也是一個重負(fù)。福利國家的擴(kuò)張十分迅速。1950年，法國的政府支出占國家經(jīng)濟(jì)（國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值）的28%，德國占30%，美國占21%。按照已故經(jīng)濟(jì)史學(xué)家安格斯•麥迪遜收集的數(shù)據(jù)，到1999年，法國的政府支出占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的52%，德國占48%，美國占30%。老齡化社會將加大未來在養(yǎng)老金、社會保障和醫(yī)療上的花費(fèi)。從2008年到2050年，德國的65歲以上人口預(yù)計將增加40%，法國將增加77%，美國則將增加121%。

鑒于這一形勢，即使目前尚未遭遇危機(jī)的國家也正采取緊縮措施。所有國家都面臨著一個災(zāi)難性的抉擇：為了給增大的福利支出提供資金，需要提高稅收或增加赤字，但這將對經(jīng)濟(jì)造成進(jìn)一步的破壞，而削減福利又會引起民眾的強(qiáng)烈反對。

從理論上講，如果經(jīng)濟(jì)加速增長，就能把政府從這個泥潭中解救出來。遺憾的是，這似乎是個幻想。確實(shí)，舊秩序的第二根支柱——深信經(jīng)濟(jì)會不斷擴(kuò)張——很值得懷疑。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們似乎已經(jīng)用盡了所有的常規(guī)政策手段。美聯(lián)儲等中央銀行已經(jīng)將利率保持在低水平。預(yù)算赤字居高不下。

美國一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家主張，美國應(yīng)該暫時增加赤字。這或許會奏效，但歐洲的經(jīng)驗(yàn)卻建議我們不要這樣做。歐洲的高額赤字導(dǎo)致了更高的利率，反映出投資者對債務(wù)違約愈加擔(dān)憂。對違約的擔(dān)憂反過來削弱了銀行——政府債券的主要持有者，并通過銀行削弱整體經(jīng)濟(jì)。

一兩個承擔(dān)過多義務(wù)的國家所采取的財政緊縮政策可能會奏效；可以通過增加出口來彌補(bǔ)減少的國內(nèi)開支，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。但大多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)國家實(shí)行的長期緊縮政策可能會嚴(yán)重拖累世界經(jīng)濟(jì)。

自二戰(zhàn)以來總體適用的理念和制度蒙上了一層陰影。20世紀(jì)20年代和30 年代早期也是如此。當(dāng)時，世界主要國家徒勞地想要保持金本位制，而金本位制在一戰(zhàn)前維系了繁榮的經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序。人們有一種天生的本能，想要頑固堅持在政治和腦力上有所投入的原有想法和做法。這種慣性加劇了大蕭條的嚴(yán)重性。

在現(xiàn)今未見緩解的政治喧囂中，相似的情況正在發(fā)生。發(fā)達(dá)國家經(jīng)濟(jì)疲軟的根源之一是消費(fèi)者和企業(yè)對2008—2009年的嚴(yán)重金融危機(jī)仍然心有余悸。但這一后果因向后看的保守心態(tài)而變得復(fù)雜。各國政府均極力維護(hù)舊秩序，因?yàn)樗鼈儾焕斫庑轮刃颍ε滦轮刃颉?/p>

Behind economic hard times, fear of the new

By Robert J. Samuelson, Published: July 26

We are witnessing “the crisis of the old order.” The phrase, coined by the late historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to describe the failure of unfettered capitalism in the late 1920s, also applies to the present, despite different circumstances. Everywhere, advanced nations face similar problems: overcommitted welfare states, aging populations, flagging economic expansion. These conditions define the global crisis and explain why it struck the United States, Europe and Japan simultaneously. We need to move beyond daily partisan fireworks to see this larger predicament.

The old order, constructed by most democracies after World War II, rested on three pillars. One was the welfare state. Government would protect the unemployed, aged, disabled and poor. Capitalism would be tamed. A second was faith in economic growth; this would raise everyone’s living standards while permitting income redistribution. Growth was ordained, because economists had learned enough from the 1930s to cure periodic recessions. Finally, global trade and finance served countries’ mutual interests.

All three pillars are now wobbling. To be sure, the financial crisis worsened matters, and each country’s situation is different. America’s welfare state is less generous than Germany’s. Greece’s crisis began because it had vastly underreported its budget deficit; Ireland’s stemmed from a burst housing bubble that led to a costly bank bailout. But these differences obscure large similarities.

Start with the welfare state. A blessing to many, it’s also a common burden. Its expansion was huge. In 1950, government spending as a share of a nation’s economy (gross domestic product) was 28 percent in France, 30 percent in Germany and 21 percent in the United States. By 1999, figures were 52 percent of GDP in France, 48 percent in Germany and 30 percent in the United States, according to figures compiled by the late economics historian Angus Maddison. Aging societies would boost future costs for pensions, social security and health care. From 2008 to 2050, the 65-plus population is projected to rise 40 percent in Germany, 77 percent in France and 121 percent in the United States.

Given this outlook, even countries without immediate crises are embracing austerity measures. All face a ruinous choice: The higher taxes or deficits needed to finance more welfare spending might further damage the economy, but cutting benefits stirs popular backlash. Still, benefits are now vulnerable. Ireland cut benefits for the unemployed by about 10 percent, reduced child payments by 16 percent and, beginning in 2014, will gradually raise the retirement age from 65 to 68.

On paper, faster economic growth could rescue governments from this trap. Unfortunately, this seems a mirage. Indeed, the old order’s second prop — faith in routine economic expansion — is suspect. Economists exaggerated their understanding and control. They seem to have exhausted conventional policy approaches. Central banks such as the Federal Reserve have held interest rates low. Budget deficits are high.

Some American economists argue the United States should temporarily run even bigger deficits. Perhaps that would work, but Europe’s experience counsels otherwise. Big deficits there led to higher interest rates, reflecting investors’ greater fears of default. Default anxieties in turn weaken banks — large holders of government bonds — and, through them, the broader economy. Although the United States hasn’t yet suffered this fate, it might, especially considering warnings from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s that exploding federal debt could cause rating downgrades.

Austerity practiced by one or two overcommitted nations may succeed; their economies can grow by increasing exports to replace lost domestic spending. But prolonged austerity practiced by most advanced countries could be a huge drag on the world economy. To whom can they export? The obvious answer is China and other “emerging markets.” But China frustrates this possibility by maintaining an artificially low currency that subsidizes its exports and sustains large trade surpluses. China sees trade as a jobs creator. It shuns the notion of trading for mutual advantage — the old order’s third pillar. The political foundation of the global trading system is at risk.

We have left our collective comfort zone. Ideas and institutions that, on the whole, served well since World War II are under a cloud. The same was true in the 1920s and early 1930s. Then, the world’s leading nations vainly struggled to maintain the gold standard, which — before World War I — had anchored a prosperous economic order. There was a natural impulse to cling to familiar ideas and practices in which people were invested politically and intellectually. This inertia contributed to the Great Depression’s severity.

Amid today’s unrelenting political uproar, something similar is happening. Economic weakness in advanced countries stems partly from the residual trauma on consumers and companies following the ferocious 2008-09 financial crisis. But the effect is complicated by a backward-looking mentality. Governments everywhere are striving to protect the old order because they do not understand and fear the new.

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