美國將打贏全球匯率戰(zhàn)　　

英國《金融時報》 馬丁·沃爾夫　　

二零一零年十月十四日　　

國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)今年年會上的主題是貨幣。更確切地說，是兩種貨幣：美元和人民幣。前者是因為被認(rèn)為太疲軟；后者是因為被認(rèn)為太僵化。然而，在這些爭論的背后有一個巨大的挑戰(zhàn)：如何最好地管理全球經(jīng)濟調(diào)整？　　

在最新一期《世界經(jīng)濟展望》(World Economic Outlook)的序言中，IMF經(jīng)濟學(xué)家奧利維爾·布蘭查德(Olivier Blanchard)指出：“實現(xiàn)‘強勁、均衡、持續(xù)’的全球復(fù)蘇--援引G20在匹茲堡確定的目標(biāo)--從來都不是易事……它要求進(jìn)行兩項根本性的、困難重重的經(jīng)濟再平衡活動。”　　

    一是內(nèi)部再平衡：發(fā)達(dá)國家恢復(fù)對私人需求的依賴；削減金融危機中形成的財政赤字。二是外部再平衡：美國及其它一些發(fā)達(dá)國家加大對凈出口的依賴；一些新興國家（特別是中國）加大對內(nèi)需的依賴。遺憾的是，布蘭查德教授的結(jié)論是：“目前這兩項再平衡活動的進(jìn)展過于緩慢。”　　

    我們可以從兩個層面來探討經(jīng)濟再平衡活動。第一，以前高消費、高赤字的發(fā)達(dá)國家，在通往太平洋投資管理公司(Pimco)的穆罕默德·埃爾--埃利安(Mohamed El-Erian)所稱的“新常態(tài)”的路上，必須讓私人部門“去杠桿化”。第二，國際收支狀況強勁和--或蘊含大好投資機遇的經(jīng)濟體，需要讓實際匯率升值，而由此導(dǎo)致的凈出口對經(jīng)濟的拖累，則需通過擴大內(nèi)需加以抵消。　　

    發(fā)行儲備貨幣的發(fā)達(dá)國家（特別是美國）所采取的激進(jìn)貨幣政策，在這兩個過程中都是一個元素。隨著市場推動各種貨幣對美元走高，痛苦的呼號如今響徹世界各地。這在一定程度上反映美國政策造成的影響不均，更反映資本流入國絕不甘愿接受必要的變化，而正試圖把不受歡迎的調(diào)整轉(zhuǎn)移到別國頭上。說白了，美國希望讓世界其它地區(qū)出現(xiàn)通脹，而后者希望讓美國陷入通縮。美國必贏無疑，因為它擁有無止境的“彈藥”：美聯(lián)儲可以不受限制地“創(chuàng)造”美元。需要討論的是世界投降的條件：即各國在名義匯率和國內(nèi)政策上所需的調(diào)整。　　

    如果你想知道美國的政策有可能達(dá)到多激進(jìn)的程度，可以聽一聽紐約聯(lián)儲主席威廉·達(dá)德利(William Dudley)近期的一番講話。他說：“近幾個季度的經(jīng)濟增長步伐一直令人失望，即使年初時我們的預(yù)期并不高。”尤其是這背后隱藏著美國家庭的去杠桿化。那么貨幣政策對此能夠發(fā)揮什么作用呢？他的答案是，“極低的利率可對資產(chǎn)估值起到支撐作用，包括使房價變得更可承受，并減少部分貸款者需支付的利息，從而有助于使調(diào)整過程變得平穩(wěn)。除此之外……就貨幣政策能夠割斷潛在負(fù)面經(jīng)濟后果分布的‘尾巴’而言……極低利率有助于鼓勵有余錢的家庭和企業(yè)花掉這些錢，從而達(dá)到上述目的。”　　

    最重要的是，當(dāng)前處于低位、且不斷下滑的通脹率有可能造成災(zāi)難性后果。在最糟糕的情況下，經(jīng)濟可能陷入債務(wù)通縮的局面。目前，美國的收益率和通脹率已經(jīng)踏上了日本在上世紀(jì)九十年代的老路。美聯(lián)儲希望阻止這一趨勢。這就是新一輪量化寬松貨幣政策似乎即將啟動的原因所在。簡言之，為了避免通縮，美國的政策制定者將采取一切必要手段。的確，美聯(lián)儲將堅決保持寬松政策，直至美國令人滿意地實現(xiàn)通貨再膨脹。此舉對世界其它地區(qū)有何影響，則不在其考慮之中。　　

這種政策會對全球造成明顯影響，包括帶動長期資產(chǎn)價格上漲，并鼓勵資本流入貨幣政策擴張性較弱的國家（如瑞士）或回報率較高的國家（如新興經(jīng)濟體）。眼下正是這種局面。華盛頓的國際金融研究所(Institute for International Finance)預(yù)測，二零一零和二零一一年期間，新興經(jīng)濟體的資本凈流入將超過八千億美元，這些資本的流入國將大舉進(jìn)行干預(yù)，只是力度會日趨減弱。　　

資本流入國（不管是發(fā)達(dá)國家還是新興國家）將面臨不愉快的選擇：或者讓匯率升值，從而削弱外部競爭力；或者干預(yù)匯市，從而蓄積不想要的美元，既影響國內(nèi)貨幣穩(wěn)定，也有損外部競爭力；或者采取稅收和管制手段，限制資本流入。歷史上各國政府會綜合采用這三種手段。這次也將一如既往。　　

自然，人們可能會設(shè)想一種相反的做法。事實上，中國反對美國的巨額財赤和非常規(guī)貨幣政策。中國也決心壓低國內(nèi)通脹，并抑制人民幣升值。這一政策表達(dá)出一種清晰的含意：實際匯率的調(diào)整，應(yīng)該經(jīng)由美國國內(nèi)物價的下跌來實現(xiàn)。中國想迫使美國進(jìn)行通縮調(diào)整，就像德國目前對希臘所做的那樣。可這種情況是不可能發(fā)生的--即使發(fā)生也不符合中國利益。作為債權(quán)國，如果美國所欠債務(wù)的實際價值出現(xiàn)增長，中國將坐收增值之利。但一旦美國陷入通縮，世界就有嚴(yán)重衰退之虞。　　

布蘭查德說的無疑很到位：今后的調(diào)整將十分艱巨，而且這一過程幾乎還沒有開始。在匯率和外部賬戶調(diào)整方面，美國非但沒有尋求合作，反而試圖通過印鈔，把自己的意志強加于人。美國無論如何都將贏得這場戰(zhàn)爭--不是讓世界其它地區(qū)陷入通脹，就是迫使它們的名義匯率對美元升值。遺憾的是，其影響也將是蕪雜不一的：防護(hù)手段較少的經(jīng)濟體（如巴西或南非）將被迫調(diào)整；有外匯管制作屏障的經(jīng)濟體（如中國），將能夠更好地適應(yīng)調(diào)整。　　

假如各方尋求達(dá)成合作的局面，情況將會好得多。或許G二十領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人甚至能夠利用他們的“相互評估程序”實現(xiàn)合作。十一月份的首爾峰會就是機會。這事從必要性來說是毋庸置疑的，但從各方的意愿來說卻有很多疑問。在危機最嚴(yán)重時期，各國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人團(tuán)結(jié)一致，而如今美聯(lián)儲即將對他們各個擊破。　　

英文原文：　　

Why America is going to win the global currency battle　　

By Martin Wolf　　

Published: October 12 2010　　

Currencies dominated this year’s annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund. More precisely, two currencies did: the dollar and the renminbi, the former because it was deemed too weak and the latter because it was deemed too inflexible. But, behind the squabbles, lies a huge challenge: how best to manage the global economic adjustment.　　

In his foreword to the new World Economic Outlook, Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s economic counsellor, states: “Achieving a ‘strong, balanced and sustained world recovery’ – to quote from the goal set in Pittsburgh by the G20 – was never going to be easy ... It requires two fundamental and difficult economic rebalancing acts.”　　

The first is internal rebalancing – a return to reliance on private demand in advanced countries and retrenchment of the fiscal deficits that opened in the crisis. The second is external rebalancing – greater reliance on net exports by the US and some other advanced countries and on domestic demand by some emerging countries, notably China. Unfortunately, concludes, Professor Blanchard, “these two rebalancing acts are taking place too slowly”.　　

We can consider this rebalancing on two dimensions. First, the erstwhile high-spending, high-deficit advanced countries need to de-leverage their private sectors on the journey to what Mohamed El-Erian of Pimco, the investment company, called “the new normal”, in his Per Jacobsson lecture. Second, the real exchange rates of economies with robust external positions, strong investment opportunities, or both, need to appreciate, while expansion of domestic demand offsets the consequent drag from net exports. 　　

Aggressive monetary policy by reserve-issuing advanced countries, particularly the US, is an element in both processes. The cries of pain now heard around the world, as markets push currencies up against the dollar, partly reflect the uneven impact of US policy. Still more, they reflect the stubborn unwillingness to accept the needed changes, with each capital recipient trying to deflect the unwanted adjustment elsewhere. 　　

To put it crudely, the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create. What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world’s surrender: the needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the world.　　

If you wish to understand how aggressive US policy might become, read a recent speech by William Dudley, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He notes that “in recent quarters the pace of growth has been disappointing even relative to our modest expectations at the start of the year”. Behind this lies deleveraging by US households, in particular. So what can monetary policy do about it? His answer is that “very low interest rates can help smooth the adjustment process by supporting asset valuations, including making housing more affordable and by allowing some borrowers to reduce debt interest payments. Beyond this ... to the extent that monetary policy can ‘cut off the tail’ of the distribution of potential adverse economic outcomes ... it can help encourage those households and businesses with money to spend to do so”.　　

Above all, today’s low and falling inflation is potentially calamitous. At worst, the economy might succumb to debt-deflation. US yields and inflation are already following the path of Japan’s in the 1990s (see chart). The Fed wants to stop this trend. That is why another round of quantitative easing seems imminent.　　

In short, US policymakers will do whatever is required to avoid deflation. Indeed, the Fed will keep going until the US is satisfactorily reflated. What that effort does to the rest of the world is not its concern.　　

The global consequences are evident: the policy will raise prices of long-term assets and encourage capital to flow into countries with less expansionary monetary policies (such as Switzerland) or higher returns (such as emerging economies). This is what is happening. The Washington-based Institute for International Finance forecasts net inflows of capital from abroad into emerging economies of more than $800bn in 2010 and 2011. It also forecasts massive intervention by recipients of this capital, albeit at a falling rate (see chart).　　

Recipients of the capital inflow, be they advanced or emerging countries, face uncomfortable choices: let the exchange rate appreciate, so impairing external competitiveness; intervene in currency markets, so accumulating unwanted dollars, threatening domestic monetary stability and impairing external competitiveness; or curb the capital inflow, via taxes and controls. Historically, governments have chosen combinations of all three. That will be the case this time, too.　　

Naturally, one could imagine an opposite course. Indeed, China objects to the huge US fiscal deficits and unconventional monetary policies. China is also determined to keep inflation down at home and limit the appreciation of its currency. The implication of this policy is clear: adjustments in real exchange rates should occur via falling US domestic prices. China wants to impose a deflationary adjustment on the US, just as Germany is doing to Greece. This is not going to happen. Nor would it be in China’s interest if it did. As a creditor, it would enjoy an increase in the real value of its claims on the US. But US deflation would threaten a world slump.　　

Prof Blanchard is clearly right: the adjustments ahead are going to be very difficult; and they have also hardly begun. Instead of co-operation on adjustment of exchange rates and the external account, the US is seeking to impose its will, via the printing press. The US is going to win this war, one way or the other: it will either inflate the rest of the world or force their nominal exchange rates up against the dollar. Unfortunately, the impact will also be higgledy piggledy, with the less protected economies (such as Brazil or South Africa) forced to adjust and others, protected by exchange controls (such as China), able to manage the adjustment better.　　

It would be far better for everybody to seek a co-operative outcome. Maybe the leaders of the group of 20 will even be able to use their “mutual assessment process” to achieve just that. Their November summit in Seoul is the opportunity. Of the need there can be no doubt. Of the will, the doubts are many. In the worst of the crisis, leaders hung together. Now, the Fed is about to hang them all separately.　　

（[email protected]，2010-10 ）　　

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