廣發之槌未落 思量宜多

劉川2006-9-18日

廣發行之槌未落，是一見好事，可容人多思量：廣東是要最好的伙伴，還是要最強的伙伴。最強的伙伴，不一定是最好的伙伴，更不一定是最合適自己的伙伴。最強的伙伴，如果與自己不是一條心的，可能就是一個最早消滅異已，也包括消滅自己的對手，以至于是敵手，視不兩立。

現在，向廣發行求婚的，有三個組團，一是美國花旗銀行為首的團隊，一是法國興業銀行為首的團隊，一是中國平安保險為首的團隊。表面上看，每一個團隊，各有奇術，成員伙伴也是五顏六色。前兩個團隊，是外資打頭，為了中看又中用，拉來了中國人壽、中國糧油、中國石化等國隊充數，以增加奪標籌碼。后一團隊，是國內保險界的野戰軍，為壯大實力，早就發展成以中國人為核心的多國部隊，有外國的管理團隊沉入其中。三組團隊，看上去最弱的是平安。但我們想一想，誰是最好的伙伴。這就需要我們知已知彼。

先說知已。第一，從業務需要亞看，廣發行是一個省級的地區性銀行，服務對象主要是廣東省城鄉地區，為此，其營業網點的分布，就不能只考慮人口稠密，金融資源豐富的城市，也要照顧到人口與儲蓄少，但老百姓需求大的鄉鎮。第二，從城鄉差距看，廣東省南富北窮，東闊西貧，不僅GDP與財稅收入主要來源于珠三角的廣州、深圳、珠海三大城，還有東莞、中山、佛山三大市，以及南海、番禹、順德三小市，而且金融資源，主要包括儲蓄、信貸和金融、證券交易等，也多集中在這一帶。廣發行的金融功能之一，就是要集有余而補不足，用富裕地區的錢，去幫補貧困地區的經濟發展。第三，廣東省經濟的城鄉二元化，不亞于文化的城鄉二元化，這兩種二元化，導致了觀念的二元化，鄉鎮地區百姓大多在溫飽階段，投資理念還在等待漫長的播種期。

再說知彼。外資銀行在華經營的目標是利潤第一。為此，它們主要看重的是廣東省最富裕的地區，但絕對不包括貧困的鄉鎮。為此，它們的服務網點的分布，重點是城市，而且是富裕的城市，不會是鄉鎮。不僅如此，它們還會收縮現有鄉鎮地區的廣發行網點，而鄉鎮又是最需要金融扶持的地方。因此，外資銀行普遍傾向是發展城市業務，收縮（甚至完全放棄中國的鄉鎮網點），以最大限度地收割中國的經濟發展與金融發展的成果。它們不希望播種，但樂于收獲；它們不希望為貧困支付成本，但急于從富裕中得到利潤，而且是利潤的最大化。這就是外資銀行的目標與特點。

以花旗銀行為例，它有三大特點。第一，它在美國，主要是發展城市金融，而美國本土的農村人口不過只有3%，它的發展方向，與美國國情是相配合的；但在世界各地，特別是在以農業人口為主的亞洲和拉美，花旗銀行在那些地方的鄉鎮，杳無蹤影，而是集中在大城市布點經營。在香港，花旗干脆自譯為“城市銀行”（City Bank），不叫“花旗”。在世界各地，花旗銀行以利潤第一，是叫得最響的，它很少為發展中國家與政府，考慮什么經濟平衡發展的問題，幫助當地政府合理利用金融資源，循環扶貧。相反，它從富裕地區攫取了利潤，只會使貧困地區的金融資源更貧困。它在印尼、墨西哥、哥倫比亞、阿根廷、巴西的歷史，完全是進入與聚集大、中城市，收縮與關閉偏遠或落后地區銀行網點的歷史，而且利用金融集聚的資源，壓制本地金融，與國家組級銀行下面叫板，是引發當地金融危機的種子銀行。二，花旗銀行的金融創新夠狠夠猛，在世界銀行同業中，有一個相當負面的評價——“街頭壞孩子”，以至成為美國銀行監管委員會的頭號烏蠅，也是歐洲與日本金融監管者的眼中釘，肉中刺。2003年美國聯邦法院判罰花旗銀行向信用卡消費者支付5.5億美元賠償金，理由是它在消費者不知情的情況下，向他們的信用卡扣取透支利息。2004年，英國金融服務管理局（簡稱FSA：The Financial Services Agency）就花旗銀行在同年8月2日操縱歐洲債券交易，構成 “異常交易行為”，第一次展開歐債的正式調查。當天，花旗集團在不到兩分鐘的時間內，在歐洲債券市場上出售了以歐元標價的歐洲政府債券，價值約為110億歐元(約合15億美元)，令該類債券價格狂跌。此后不久，花旗集團又趁低價買回40億歐元。2005年，日本FSA對花旗銀行在日本的分行幫助黑社會洗錢，予其日本歷史上最嚴厲的懲罰——關閉它的私人理財部門與全部相關業務。2005年，歐盟證券暨金融交易委員會對花旗銀行予以重罰及公開譴責，理由是它在證券市場上，利用股票與其它衍生工具進行交叉運作，違反了正常的交易守則，該項罰款為5億歐元，以及退出全部交易所得。盡管它的金融創新，常常打破監管漏洞，有幫助政府改進監管之利，但這不是它的慈善目的，只是一種客觀的結果。第三，自1980年代中期以來，花旗銀行的主要利潤來源是信用卡利息，2003-2004年度，竟然達至全部利潤的60%。根據國際經驗，當一個地區年人均GDP超過1000美元，就進入信用卡發卡、用卡與循環利率支付的發展期。廣東省已經在2002年就達到這一標準，尤其是三大城、三大市、三小市的人均年收入，早就過了1萬人民幣，是花旗信用卡的大金礦！這正是老布什急于給中國政府發出“公關信”，助其競投廣發行的根本原因。想想看，花旗銀行入股上海浦東發展銀行后，死死抓住信用卡的業務不放，搞得合作方很不痛快，正是廣發行的前車之鑒。

花旗銀行為推廣應用信用卡，首先就致力于改變所在地的傳統文化，從而為美國式的信用文化——即透支消費文化，或曰過度消費的文化。其次，強調個人理財文化，突出個人消費與大額財富管理，這種管理導致了它在經營理財務中的第三個突出的作法，就是利用衍生工具，在證券與金融市場上翻云覆雨。消費文化——個人理財——衍生交易，這三大業務，已經不是傳統的銀行業務，即不再是傳統的信貸業務，這種突出個人、突出富人、突出風險的經營方式，絕對不符合發展中國國家的利益，也不符合廣東省這樣一個需要平衡發展的人口大省（中國人口第三大省，共有9300萬）政府與百姓的利益。而這種透支消費文化，在國內尚無個人信用來臺與全國性征信機制的基礎上，如果在省內發展，將是全省性金融危機的最大隱患。難道廣東省政府愿意引入這樣一種文化，來與自己的政治與經濟發展目標背道而馳嗎？難道廣東省政府愿意把自己打造成一個中國金融領域中高風險的省份嗎？難道廣東省政府愿意把廣發行變成一個高風險而又不聽管束的“壞孩子”嗎？如果廣東省政府不慎將它引入，以其理念改造廣發行，若干年后才發現引狼入室了，則為時晚矣。因為，如果讓花旗銀行進了家門，再想趕出去，談何容易，介時就不是簡單的引入外資的問題，而必然是中美外交的大事了，美國政府的外交干涉勢在必然。花旗銀行從來不是省油的燈，無論是在日本、歐盟犯了事，何時不見美國政府出面說項，在發展中國國家，更是如此，在香港金融危機中，花旗不僅背地里給金融大鄂釋放大量短期貸款，而且還鼓動美國駐港領事館出面，攻擊香港政府的入市自衛行動。難道廣東省政府愿意以此成為全國關注的焦點嗎？換言之，廣東省政府愿意成為一個不良的銀行引資的壞典型嗎？可以預言，廣東省若引花旗銀行入主廣發行，將付出難以評估的政治與經濟代價。

彼已對照，我們的目標，與花旗銀行的業務目標與特點一致嗎？當然不一致，連大至一致也談不上。從這一巨大差異上看，若冀望它未來與本省的長遠計劃達成默契，更不可能。早知明日，何必今天？晚一點落槌，不但是好事，也是幸事，免得請神容易送神難。

此外，有一點不能不提。花旗銀行在十九末至二十世紀中葉，在中國掠奪白銀與金融資源的歷史，也是有案可查的。對任何外資都一樣，有歷史劣跡的，不清算，必重犯。中國任何一級政府，如果忘記這一點，就是對人民的不負責任，也是對歷史的背叛。

政府要把住的關口是：為中國選最好的外資，而不是最強的外資；為廣發行選最好的伙伴，而不是最強的伙伴。只要對廣發行最好，又何必請最強的進來，助紂為虐，令其變為強盜呢？

重要資料：（因其它資料均有中文，故只引一則國內無的一則）

來自《紐約時報》：

Japan Shuts Unit of Citibank, Citing Violations

September 18, 2004
 By TODD ZAUN


TOKYO, Sept. 17 - In one of the severest penalties ever
imposed on a bank in Japan, regulators on Friday ordered
Citigroup to close its Japanese private banking operations
because of serious violations of the country's banking
laws.

The Financial Services Agency ordered Citibank to shut the
four branches in Japan where it offers private banking
services to wealthy customers after the agency discovered a
string of violations and improprieties over the last three
years. The actions cited included failing to put in effect
measures to prevent money laundering, overcharging
customers for financial derivative products and making
loans that helped clients carry out a variety of improper
deals, regulators said.

"A number of acts injurious to public interests, serious
violations of laws and regulations, and extremely
inappropriate transactions were uncovered at the Private
Bank Group, which led us to conclude that continued future
operations are inappropriate," the Financial Services
Agency wrote in its order.

Citibank in Japan apologized for the violations and vowed
to improve its management and its internal controls.

"Citibank Japan sincerely apologizes for the problems
identified in the F.S.A. orders and is earnestly addressing
the issues raised and working to prevent their recurrence,"
the bank said in a statement. It added that it "is
committed to doing everything necessary to restore the
confidence of its customers."

The bank was ordered to come up with a plan to improve its
business operations by Oct. 22. Citibank will have a year
to close its private banking business. Though it cannot
accept new customers after Sept. 29, the bank can continue
to serve its current clients until Sept. 30, 2005. On that
date, regulators will revoke Citibank's license to operate
the four branches and they must be closed. Citibank could
reapply for those licenses, but that would probably take
years.

The bank said it did not know yet what would happen to the
400 employees working in the Japanese private banking
division.

Citibank also has 25 retail branches in Japan, but those
branches are not affected by Friday's order.

It was the second time this week that Citigroup has
expressed contrition for breaches in its overseas
operations.

On Tuesday, the company apologized for a huge bond trade in
Europe that outraged competitors and led to an
investigation by regulators in Britain; France and Germany
are also looking into the trade. In early August, Citigroup
traders sold 11 billion euros of European government debt
($13 billion) within minutes via an electronic trading
system only to buy some of it back less than an hour later
at lower prices.

The transactions were not illegal, but rivals said
Citigroup violated an unwritten rule among big bond houses
not to use their trading heft to manipulate prices.

Citibank's private banking business in Japan concentrates
on customers with about $1 million to save or invest and
emphasizes highly personalized service. But regulators said
Citibank's private banking division often misled its
well-heeled clients. Regulators said Citibank charged some
customers above-market prices for publicly traded
derivatives and failed to explain fully the risks involved
in many of its financial products.

Regulators say Citibank also went beyond the scope of its
banking license by brokering real estate and art deals for
its rich clients - activities not allowed under Japanese
banking laws.

Private banking employees were also reckless with client
information, the bank regulators said. For example, some
employees kept records of secret passwords for the most
forgetful clients. Regulators discovered no cases of
employees using the passwords to steal money.

Toshihide Endo, director of the Financial Services Agency's
supervisory bureau, said that employees of the private
banking group might have been tempted to take shortcuts
when screening clients because "their salaries and
performance evaluations were closely linked to sales
targets.''

"That might be one of the main reasons this kind of
misconduct happened at Citibank," he said.

In one case, the private banking unit in Japan accepted a
customer who had been flagged repeatedly as suspicious by
another unit of Citibank, the agency said in its statement.
In another, the private banking group made a loan to a
group of clients who used the money in a stock manipulation
scheme. One of those same clients received a short-term
loan from Citibank to inflate his account balance
temporarily in a scheme to secure a government grant, Mr.
Endo said.

Citibank said on Friday that six executives in Japan had
left the company because of the problems made public Friday
and that it had reprimanded other employees.

In July, Citigroup appointed its chief auditor, Douglas
Peterson, to succeed Charles Whitehead as chief executive
of the Japan operations.

A Citibank Japan spokesman, Toru Ichikawa, would not
comment on whether Mr. Whitehead's departure was related to
the troubles at the private banking division.

Citigroup does not provide figures on how much the private
banking business in Japan contributes to its overall
revenue or profit, but overseas private banking contributed
only about 3 percent of Citigroup's net income in 2003.

Citibank's retail banking unit was also ordered to stop
taking new foreign-currency deposits for one month,
beginning Sept. 29, and to improve management controls.
This suspension came for failing to detect a case in which
a Citibank employee embezzled 1.8 billion yen (currently
$16.4 million) from depositors over seven years, beginning
in 1997.

The only other bank to face shutdown orders from Japanese
regulators was Credit Suisse Financial Products, which had
its banking license revoked in 1999 for blocking an
investigation into whether it was engineering financial
products specifically to help companies conceal losses on
their accounting statements. The company was a unit of the
Credit Suisse Group.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/18/business/worldbusiness/18citi.html?ex=1096499638&ei=1&en=070124c55e8b9bad

× 烏有之鄉 WYZXWK.COM

您的打賞將用于網站日常運行與維護。
幫助我們辦好網站，宣傳紅色文化！

歡迎掃描下方二維碼，訂閱烏有之鄉網刊微信公眾號