6月29日，在電視上看了重慶的中華紅歌會。不錯。6月30日，在電視上看了中央電視臺的慶祝晚會。也還不錯。7月1日，在網上看了看，發現紐約時報網站上已有些“祝賀”中國共產黨建黨90周年的文章，其中有好幾篇在慶祝未來的諾貝爾和平獎獲得者艾未未及胡佳已在七一前獲釋。另兩篇6月30日的“祝賀”文章也不錯，于是復制下來，星期天花了點時間譯出來，并寫了點簡單的評論。
    第一篇的題目是《偉大的黨，但共產主義在哪里？》。只看題目及開頭，還以為是一位海外左派寫的呢，他責罵共產黨，是希望共產黨來搞真正的共產主義。但隨后就看到，作者看起來更像是個89余孽，如同茅于軾賀衛方們一樣，他們用的方法都差不多，先瘋狂地攻擊毛澤東時代，然后大力表揚中國經濟改革，最后尖銳批評當今的中國共產黨，這樣就把屎盆子牢牢地扣到共產黨頭上了，共產黨也就完成它的歷史“屎”命。文章中所說的經濟革命造就的強大社會力量及所謂中產階級，也就可以通過所謂民主、自由、法治等類口號和程序合法地上臺執政，保住并繼續擴大經濟改革的勝利果實了。文中最后提醒中共，一黨執政的紀錄為74年，中共恐怕破不了這個紀錄了。這種說法有點類似前久的希拉里講話，想阻擋住民主的潮流，想賴在臺上不走，stay in power，能拖就拖，是傻瓜在胡折騰。這篇“祝賀”文章更像是悼詞，或詛咒，90歲了，執政62年了，快去死吧。
    第二篇的題目是《中共在90》。文章的前半部分嫌黨史第二卷寫得還不夠好，雖然徹底否定了文革，但還是沒有把黨的錯誤寫足寫透寫夠，如沒寫大躍進時餓死了4500萬人，沒寫鄧小平在反右中的出色表現，沒徹底否定毛澤東而是找了些頂罪的。文章還提到趙紫陽沒有如華國鋒那樣死后被“平反”。反毛者最后必反鄧擁趙，看來中外的反毛者為完成資本主義復興大業已統一了認識。文章的后半部分開始表揚鄧小平去世之后1997-2009年間中國搞的一些政治體制改革，作者認為中共如繼續改革下去就能避免如原蘇共一樣崩潰。停滯、僵化和倒退沒有出路。這很滑稽，原蘇共不正是按他們的指示使勁折騰最后將自己折騰死了么？作者推舉出改革派的領導。國外的一些文章總喜歡造謠說中共內部有對立的派別或權力斗爭，顯然，這些人在時刻夢想中國也會出現利比亞那樣的反對派，或者出一兩個當年蘇聯那樣的戈爾巴或葉利欽，那樣肢解瓜分起中國來就更方便了。中國共產黨也就找到新的出路了。文章的最后同樣沒有忘記寫上幾句祝賀中國共產黨90歲生日的話，90多歲了，該死了，垂死掙扎是沒用的。
    這群王八蛋。這樣來祝賀我們的黨，偉大的中國共產黨，90歲的生日。

2011/7/4

附一：
偉大的黨，但共產主義在哪里？
Minxin Pei，2011/6/30，紐約時報網站
    無疑，從90年前代表50余個黨員的12個一大代表建立了中國共產黨起，中國共產黨已經走過了一段長路。
    然而，無論當時它看起來是多么地弱小，它的意識形態、身份與使命是毫無疑問的。在馬克思主義烏托邦的啟示下，黨代表了中國的理想主義左派、民族主義者和被壓迫者。它的任務是結束社會的不公和西方的殖民主義。
    今天，黨是一頭政治巨獸，它有8000萬黨員，控制著世界第二大經濟體。在國內，它對權力的掌握沒有有組織的挑戰，在國外，它的領導者被給予了毛和周恩來從來不曾夢想過的尊敬。
    確實，我們該給予這個黨它所應得的東西，因為它拋棄了前三十年執政的毛主義的瘋狂——大規模的恐怖、饑餓、殘酷的政治運動和邪惡的權力斗爭——根本上地改善了中國13億人的物質生活。
    然而，如果我問，“共產黨代表什么？”幾乎沒有一個今天的中國領導人會給出一個一致的或誠實的回答。
    這我們知道：它不再代表一種烏托邦的意識形態。如果真有一種意識形態是黨所代表的，這種意識形態是權力意識形態。黨統治的唯一理由，是黨一直掌握權力是絕對必要的。
    黨也不代表中國的群眾。盡管它做了很多努力去擴展它的社會基礎，去更多地聯系中國有活力的、多樣化的社會，今天的這個黨卻已發展成為一臺自我服務的、官僚主義化的政治庇護機器。它無可否認地成了一個精英黨，它百分之七十以上的黨員來自政府官員，軍隊，大學畢業生，商人和教授。
    因此，從它所有外在表現來看，這個黨實際上面臨著一個存在危機和一個不確定的未來。除了繼續呆在臺上，它沒有公共意義。這個危機不僅是意識形態上的，還是政治上的。這大體上解釋了這個黨和它的精英們的犬儒主義、腐敗和不安全感。
    由于這個黨已堅定地拒絕民主化，因此它的唯一生存策略就是繼續維持自1989年6月天安門鎮壓后開始的這一進程：從經濟增長中獲取政治合法性，但依賴鎮壓去粉碎對它的權力壟斷的挑戰。雖然這一策略自天安門事件以來一直運行得很好，但它的有效性和可持續性越來越受到懷疑。
    在經濟層面上，增長將慢下來。人口老齡化、資源約束、經濟改革停止及環境惡化幾乎肯定會壓低中國的增長潛力。世界銀行一份樂觀的預報中預測2016-2020中國的年經濟增長率約為7%——一個可觀的數字，但與目前年增長率相比，跌了30%。
    中國的經濟革命也釋放出了強大的社會力量，這種力量將使維持一黨之國更加困難。這個黨的統治哲學和組織結構使它難于與中國日益增長的中產階級在政治上結合起來。經濟減速和日漸增多的政治激進主義的匯聚，將從幾個方向挑戰這個黨的統治。
    現在中國共產黨已經執政62年了，它的領導者們或許也想注意，一黨執政的紀錄是74年，由原蘇共保持，第二名是墨西哥的IRP，71年。
    因此，當中國的領導人們舉杯慶祝黨的90歲生日時，他們應該不會懷有幻想，這個黨能永遠戰勝歷史的幾率。

Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California.

附二：
中共在90
作者：DAVID SHAMBAUGH，2011/6/30，紐約時報網站
    北京——為了紀念黨的90歲生日，執政的中國共產黨發起了全國范圍內的紀念儀式與洪水般的媒體復蓋宣傳，但所有的這些喧鬧都隱藏不住這個黨的不安情形。
    中國中央電視臺（CCTV）已在連續播放關于黨史的長篇敘述性記錄片，書店里充滿了紅色封面的歷史書籍，博物館里舉行了各種特殊的展覽——包括新國家博物館的“復興之路”。最后，黨的總書記胡錦濤，還將發表一個全國講話。
    這些慶祝活動的主題是共產黨洗刷了中國的“百年恥辱”，給中國帶來了繁榮與尊嚴。對過去所受侵略、侵害的敘述是普遍深入的，同樣普遍的斷言是，共產黨重建了社會并恢復了中國在世界上的合理地位。
    與這些歡慶活動相伴的是一場空前的官方對黨史的回顧。在16年的準備之后，中央黨史研究辦公室寫出了一本1000多頁的從1949-1978年的黨史（1978年后的歷史顯然仍太政治敏感，因其中的很多官員仍在當權）。
    這一卷雖然提供了很多毛時代時的敏感事件的新材料，但它仍是高度選擇性的并在很大程度上與1982年公報中的主要敘述保持一致：“我黨歷史中的某些問題”。
    書中一點都沒提到1950年代政治運動的暴行，這些暴行導致了數千萬人的死亡（一些運動被談到了，但沒提到被迫害的及被殺害的）。1956年的“百花齊放運動”完全沒有被提到，在這場運動中，知識分子對黨的領導發起了全面批評（其中許多批評如今還適用）。只有隨后的反右運動被寫進去了（以一種無害化處理后的方式）——但沒提鄧小平在指揮這場運動中的角色。
    大躍進，制造出了“三年困難時期（1960-1962）”，根據歷史學家弗蘭克迪科特對新檔案材料的研究，造成了4500萬人的死亡。大躍進和文化大革命（1966-76）得到實質性的處理，但這兩大災難基本上被歸結為由林彪、江青及四人幫等極左分子的篡黨奪權造成。
    毛自己確實受到批評，但全部的譴責都被轉移到別人身上去了。毛的繼承者華國鋒死后被“平反”，但趙紫陽沒有那樣的好運。
    官方對這些事件的處理是清楚的：維持一個強大的制度組織，保持警惕，反對黨內的篡權與外國的破壞。因此，即使在一個周年慶祝中，這個黨仍然無法誠實地、全面地面對它的過去，這充分說明了它的現在與將來。這是它對當前不安的癥狀表現。
    自2009年秋以來，隨著17屆四中全會的召開，中國和世界看到了一個更壓抑和不安的共產黨，一些1997-2009年間進行的政治改革，現在慢下來了。
    盡管政治停滯，但三套改革仍在繼續：擴大地方黨委的有多位候選人的選舉，增加地方預算和資源分配的透明度，在黨政的各種層面上努力改進賢能領導。但在如何使主要政策制定更加透明、懲治普遍的腐敗、改進黨內民主和黨外監督及開放媒體方面，全都停下來了。
    這些改革都來自于黨對蘇聯及其它一些一黨政權的崩潰進行的研究。中國共產黨從這些外國例子中得出的主要經驗是要主動、靈活、適應，從上述方面去進行政治改變。停止和教條被看作是停滯與崩潰的原因。
    然而，當這個黨過了90歲時，我們所看到的卻與這相反。它不是無憂的和自信的，而是看上去被未來嚇得呆住了，不能確信自己對少數民族地區的控制（西藏、新疆和內蒙），害怕正在增加的社會不滿和一些特別的游行，擔心宏觀經濟與外交關系，以及最終，2012年主要權力的交接。
    此外，一個內部安全力量、巨型國企、宣傳機構及軍隊的聯盟已與黨內的強硬路線因素結合起來，一起把改革往后拉。
    然而在黨內有一個由溫家寶總理領導的改革派，它提倡政治更加開放。然而它沒有資源或聯盟去重啟政治改革。黨內的裂縫正變得又高又深，表明觀點和派系的黨員們正日益兩極分化。即將到來的權力交接僅增加了被厭惡與打擊的風險。
    90歲的中國共產黨有點象很多90多歲的老人：越來越衰弱，膽小害怕，設法延長壽命，但因這太復雜而終歸失敗。

David Shambaugh 是一個華盛頓大學的教授和“中國政策綱要” 的主持者及《中國共產黨：萎縮與適應》一書的作者。

Great Party, but Where's the Communism?
By MINXIN PEI
Published: June 30, 2011

There is little question that the Chinese Communist Party has come a long way since it was founded 90 years ago by 12 delegates representing roughly 50 members.

Yet however insignificant it may have seemed back then, there was no question about its ideology, identity and mission. Inspired by utopian Marxism, the party represented China’s idealist leftists, nationalists and the downtrodden. Its mission was to end social injustice and Western colonialism.

Today the party is a political behemoth, with 80 million members and control of the world’s second-largest economy. At home its grip on power faces no organized challenge; abroad its leaders are accorded a respect Mao and Zhou Enlai could not have dreamed of.

Indeed, we should give the party its due for having abandoned the Maoist madness of its first three decades in power — the mass terror, famine, brutal political campaigns and vicious power struggles — and for radically improving the material lives of China’s 1.3 billion people.

Yet if asked, “What does the Communist Party stand for,” few Chinese leaders today could give a coherent or honest answer.

This much we know: It no longer stands for a utopian ideology. If there is one ideology that the party represents, it is the ideology of power. The sole justification for the party’s rule is the imperative to stay in power.

Nor does the party stand for China’s masses. Despite efforts to broaden its social base and make it more connected with China’s dynamic and diverse society, the party today has evolved into a self-serving, bureaucratized political patronage machine. It is undeniably an elitist party, with more than 70 percent of its members recruited from government officials, the military, college graduates, businessmen and professionals.

So for all its apparent power, the party is in fact facing an existential crisis and an uncertain future. Apart from staying in power, it has no public purpose. The crisis is not only ideological, but also political; it explains much of the cynicism, corruption and insecurity of the party and its elites.

As the party has firmly rejected democratization, its only strategy for survival is to maintain the course it has embarked on since the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989: drawing political legitimacy from economic growth but relying on repression to crush challenges to its monopoly of power. Although this strategy has worked well since Tiananmen, its effectiveness and sustainability are increasingly in doubt.

On the economic front, growth is about to slow down. Demographic aging, resource constraints, stalled economic reforms and environmental degradation are almost certain to depress China’s growth potential. An optimistic World Bank forecast predicts a growth rate from 2016-2020 of about 7 percent annually — a respectable number, but a 30 percent drop from today’s rate.

China’s economic revolution is also unleashing powerful social forces that will make maintaining a one-party state more tenuous. The party’s governing philosophy and organizational structure make it difficult to incorporate China’s growing middle-class politically. The convergence of an economic slowdown and rising political activism will challenge the party’s rule from several directions.

Now that the Chinese Communist Party has been in power for 62 years, its leaders might also want to note that the record for one-party rule is 74 years, held by the Soviet party, followed by the 71-year rein of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party.

So when Chinese leaders toast their party’s 90th birthday, they should harbor no illusions that the party can beat history’s odds forever.

Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California.

China's Communist Party at 90
By DAVID SHAMBAUGH
Published: June 30, 2011

BEIJING — Nationwide ceremonies and a deluge of media coverage have been mobilized by China’s ruling Communist Party to mark its 90th anniversary today. But all the hoopla cannot conceal the party’s insecure state.

Central China Television (CCTV) has been airing long narrative documentaries about the party’s history; bookstores are full of red-covered histories; museums have mounted special exhibitions — including the new National Museum’s “Road to Rejuvenation.” And the buildup will be capped by a nationwide address by the party’s general secretary, President Hu Jintao.

The main theme in all these celebrations has been that the party has provided China prosperity and dignity following a “century of shame and humiliation.” The narrative of past aggression and aggrievement is pervasive, as is the affirmation that the party has rebuilt Chinese society and restored China’s rightful place in the world.

Accompanying the festivities is an unprecedented official look into the party’s past. After 16 years of preparation, the Central Party History Research Office has produced a 1,000-plus-page compendium of the party’s history from 1949 to 1978 (post-1978 apparently remains too politically sensitive because many of the officials involved are still in power).

While the tome provides many new details of sensitive events during the Mao era, it is still highly selective and largely in step with the master narrative laid down in the 1982 publication: “Certain Questions in Our Party’s History.”

Nowhere mentioned is the violence of political campaigns during the 1950s that cost the lives of tens of millions (some of the campaigns are discussed, but not the persecutions and killings). The 1956 Hundred Flowers Movement, in which intellectuals launched broadside critiques of party rule (many which remain apt today), is totally absent. Only the subsequent “Anti-Rightist” purge is covered (in a sanitized fashion) — but not Deng Xiaoping’s role in directing it.

The Great Leap Forward, which produced the “three bitter years” (1960-62) and claimed the lives of up to 45 million, according to new archival research by the historian Frank Dikotter, and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) receive substantial treatment. But both catastrophes are essentially attributed to the usurping of party rule by “leftist opportunists” like Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four.

Mao himself does come in for criticism, but overall the blame is shifted to others. Mao’s successor Hua Guofeng does benefit from a posthumous “rehabilitation,” but no such luck for the disgraced Zhao Ziyang.

The official treatment of these events is clear: maintain a strong institutional apparatus and remain vigilant against inner-party usurpers and foreign saboteurs. Thus, even in the midst of an anniversary celebration, the party’s continuing inability to honestly and fully confront its past speaks volumes about its present and future. It is symptomatic of existing insecurities.

Since the autumn of 2009, following the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee, China and the world have witnessed a more repressive and insecure Communist Party, including a slowing of some political reforms undertaken from 1997-2009.

Despite the political stagnation, three sets of reforms have continued: expanding multi-candidate elections to local level party committees; increased transparency in local budgeting and resource allocation; and efforts to improve meritocracy at all levels of the party and government. But efforts to make central policy making more transparent, to prosecute pervasive corruption, to improve “intra-party democracy” and “extra-party supervision,” and to open up the media have all stagnated.

These reforms all grew out of the party’s study of the collapse of the Soviet Union and other one-party regimes. The main lesson the Chinese Communist Party drew from these foreign examples was to be proactive, flexible and adaptive, and to manage political change from above. Stasis and dogmatism were seen as recipes for stagnation and collapse.

What we are witnessing as the party turns 90, however, is the opposite. Instead of being secure and confident, it is seemingly frozen in fear of the future, unsure about its grip over ethnic regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia), afraid of rising social unrest and ad hoc demonstrations, worried about the macro-economy and foreign relations, and on the cusp of a major leadership transition in 2012.

Moreover, a coalition of internal security forces, giant state-owned corporations, the propaganda apparatus, and the military have joined with hard-line elements in the party to pull back from reforms.

Yet there is a reformist wing in the party, led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, which advocates more open politics. But it does not have the resources or allies to re-ignite political reforms. The intra-party cleavage runs high and deep and party members here indicate viewpoints and factions are becoming increasingly polarized. The pending leadership transition only adds to the risk aversion and crackdown.

China’s Communist Party at 90 is a bit like many 90-year-olds: increasingly infirm, fearful, experimenting with ways to prolong life, but overwhelmed by the complexities of managing it.

David Shambaugh is professor and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University and the author of “China’s Communist Party: Atrophy & Adaptation.”

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